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ARTICLES
ARE LAWYERS TRULY GREEDY?
AN ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
By: Paul F. Teich
ABSTRACT

A serious and widespread complaint about lawyers is the charge that they
are motivated by greed. More than half of Americans polled during the past
two decades have agreed with the following statements: "lawyers are greedy,"
"lawyers make too much money," "lawyers charge excessive fees," and "lawyers are more interested in making money than in serving their clients." Today, Americans commonly assert that lawyers cheat their clients by hiding the
reasons fees are imposed and charging for services that have never been
provided.
Serious examination of the charge is overdue. If lawyers frequently swindle
clients, a pressing ethical problem exists that bar authorities, the police, and
criminal prosecutors have to confront and eliminate. Further, the public's
concerns affect the business of law; the presumed cost of representation is the
principal reason Americans avoid soliciting legal help.
Despite the very recent downturn in demand by consumers for legal services, demand has risen dramaticallyduring the past thirty-five years overall,
and aggregatedemand is significantly highertoday than it was several decades
ago. Duringthe past two decades, complaints about lawyers have also grown
more strident. This Article addresses a single question: Have lawyers exploited the increase in demand for their services by adopting increasingly
graspingpractices such as price gauging, overbilling,and aggressive collection
strategies? This Article examines relevant empirical evidence andproposes an
answer: The term "greedy" unquestionably fails to describe average practitioners. The great bulk of practitionersare careful to control annual increases
in the size of lawyer and paralegalfees; fee averages have increased only very
slowly over decades throughout the country. Practitionersfrequently provide
free services for which they do not bill and typically avoid overbearingcollection practices (a very large share of billed fees commonly are not collected),
and practitionerscollectively perform hundreds of thousands of hours of community service and pro bono work annually. The value of their donated services can be conservatively estimated to be over $1 billion annually. It is also
true that the evidence fails to support the view that lawyers routinely overbill.
Finally, the moderate real income increase that has been experienced by the
average practitionerover the recent past, while greaterthan that of the average
American worker, is explainable as the result of two factors: an increase in
productivity and relative insulation from the forces of global economic
competition.
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INTRODUCTION

The Question at Issue and its Answer in Brief

Since the early 1990s, the majority of Americans have repeatedly
expressed the belief that lawyers charge too much for their services.

The public is concerned not only about fee size but also about billing
misconduct. It is claimed, for example, that lawyers routinely hide the
reasons that fees are imposed, refuse to account for their hours, and
charge for services that have never been provided-that they routinely fee gouge. Understandably then, the majority also believe that
lawyers earn excessive incomes and that the average practicing lawyer
is quite literally "greedy."'
Every lawyer should take the public's concern about greed seriously, and bar leaders should worry about the factors that provoke
that concern. When deciding whether to secure a lawyer's help,
1. See infra Part III, for specific public views on lawyer greed.
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Americans consider the likely cost of help to be critically important.2
Americans pay for personal legal services primarily from current income,3 and cost is the principal reason Americans avoid bringing otherwise insoluble law-related problems to lawyers.' Further, if lawyers
are routinely cheating clients, as is often charged, their dishonesty
should be considered a shameful professionalism problem that disciplinary authorities need to aggressively confront and eliminate. Finally, public beliefs about lawyer greed are influential determinants of
the profession's occupational prestige,s and the reputation of lawyers
affects public confidence in the justice system generally. Greed, in all
its purported manifestations, is worth studying and addressing, and
mistaken beliefs about lawyer behavior and motivation are worth
correcting.
Available evidence indicates that the demand for legal services has
dropped since the onset of the 2007-2009 recession.' A languishing
economy has contributed to lawyer layoffs, salary decreases, and hiring freezes.' But the recent setback to the sector is just that-recent.
For decades before the recession, the sector experienced tremendous
and uninterrupted growth.' Further, the fall in demand appears to
have already ended. Demand seems to be growing again-albeit
slowly. 9 It needs to be emphasized that the recession-prompted drop,
while noteworthy, has actually erased only a small fraction of the
overall increase in demand that has occurred since the early 1970s. 1 o
2. Barbara A. Curran, Report on the 1989 Survey of the Public's Use of Legal
Services, in Am. BAR ASS'N, Two NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILoT ASSESSMENTS
OF THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR AND OF THE PUBLIC GENERALLY

(1989).

3. Id. at 60.
4. Id. at 82.

5. See infra text accompanying note 53.
6. The National Bureau of Economic Research has determined that the recent
"great recession" began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. See, e.g., Chris
Isidore, Recession Officially Ended in June 2009, CNN

MONEY

(Sept. 20, 2010, 4:00

PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/20/newsleconomy/recessionover/index.htm.
7. Eli Wald, Forward: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78
L. REV. 2051, 2051-52 (2010).

FORD-

HAM

8. See infra text accompanying footnotes 30-35.
9. See Hildebrandt Baker Robins, PMI Rises in Fourth Quarter, Flat for 2010,

2 (Jan. 28, 2011), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/files/q4-pmireport.pdf ("In 2010, the legal market reflected the ups and downs of the overall
economy - stabilizing early in the year, and suffering slight setbacks mid-year. We
entered 2011 on a more positive note, as the uptick in demand seen at the end of 2010
across many important cyclical practices like corporate, real estate and litigation is
encouraging. It appears that momentum will carry over and demand will continue to
rise this year .... ).
10. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GRoss-DOMESTICPRODUCT-BY-INDUSTRY DATA (last modified Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.bea.gov/industry/gpotables/gpo action.cfm?anon=976139&tableid=27017&format type=0.
GDP is considered a proxy for the general economic demand for goods and services
within a nation. The contribution made by legal services to GDP actually rose in 2007
and 2008, but it fell from $291 billion to $282 billion in 2009-close to a 3% decline in
a single year. Id. The decline reduced the value of legal services' contribution to
PEER MONITOR INDEX,
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This Article, in significant part, is about the increase in demand that
has occurred over the past several decades. More specifically, this Article concerns the growth in the sector that has occurred due to individuals' (rather than businesses') need for services. The demand for
legal services provided by private practitioners to individuals has risen
significantly in the United States since the early 1970s-more than
200%" when measured by lawyer receipts "coming from individuals."' 2 By comparison, since 1970 the population has increased by
about 50%." It is also true that since 1970, complaints about lawyer
greed have grown more strident. This Article addresses a single question: has the increase in demand for legal services by individual American consumers contributed to the rise in negative public feeling about
lawyer greed or, to put the question differently, has the profession
exploited the increase in demand and generated legitimate public resentment? "Greed" is an unforgiving term. Its use to describe the
profession as a whole suggests that unconscionable prices for legal service are standard and the incomes of practitioners bloated. It is of
course logically possible that the profession has exploited the rise in
demand for legal services that has occurred in the past forty years;
that lawyers have increased the price of routine legal services to unconscionable levels; that dishonest billing and draconian collection
practices have become ordinary; and that the incomes of practitioners
who serve individuals have soared. It is possible that lawyers have
turned their backs on their communities and abandoned civic and pro
bono work in order to maximize income while consumers are vulnerable. The purpose of this Article is simply to address whether any of
these things has occurred. Survey research sponsored or conducted by
lawyer and paralegal professional organizations as well as by government agencies suggests that none of these things has occurred. This

GDP below its 2007 level. Id. Since demand for legal services, however, began to rise
at the end of 2010, see supra note 9, and demand has almost certainly continued to
rise during 2011, the lion's share of the increase in demand since the early 1970s has
clearly survived the "great recession."
11. See infra notes 30, 34.
12. When used on "law firm census" questionnaires circulated to practitioners by
the United States Census Bureau, the term "individuals" means individuals and the
estates of individuals. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS, LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1997), available at http://www.census.
gov/epcd/www/pdf/97sv/sv8lOO.pdf. The questionnaires, which are distributed at fiveyear intervals, ask law firms to report receipts and the sources of receipts. When used
in any part of this Article that concerns sources of lawyer receipts, the term "individuals" has the meaning assigned by the Census Bureau.
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011,
tbl.2 at 8 (2008) [hereinafter 2011 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT], available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/2011pubs/llstatab/pop.pdf (showing that the resident United States
population was 205,052,000 in 1970 and 307,439,000 in 2009).
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Article reviews the relevant research 1 4 and elaborates on the following points.
Many state bar associations periodically undertake professional "economic surveys" to gather information about law office management
practices, lawyers' fees, and lawyers' incomes. Since 1991, at least one
national paralegal organization has occasionally polled paralegal
workers concerning their economic circumstances, and national
surveys of consumers have sometimes been conducted to learn more
about the legal needs of the public and the actions that Americans
undertake to meet those needs.
Little useful data about the fixed and contingent fees that American
lawyers charge has been collected by the researchers conducting these
surveys, but information concerning the hourly fees that are charged
has been regularly gathered. Reports of survey results allow inferences to be drawn about the speed with which hourly fees are rising
throughout the United States generally.
On survey questionnaires, bar associations often ask practitioners
whether they ever charge by the hour and if they do, what single fee
amount is the one most frequently charged. Concerning this "typical
hourly fee," data in bar-sponsored economic surveys' 5 show the
following:
* The real median or real average fee (whichever is reported by a
bar association) does not inevitably rise in a given jurisdiction
across time. Rather it is likely to fluctuate-sometimes rising
and sometimes falling. Declines over multiyear periods occur in
most states. The real median fee charged in one state, Michigan,
fell across a recent thirty-one-year period (1972-2003), for example. Over many decades, the standard fee charged in a jurisdiction is likely to rise, however, even when measured in real (or
constant) dollars.
* It is common for the size of the real median or real average fee
in a given state to increase over many decades at an average
compounded rate of less than 1% per year, although a higher
rate of increase has sometimes been recorded over a multiyear
period.
* The slow rate of increase in a state's "typical" hourly fee (median or average) is often manifest in the total size of the increase
that has occurred during the time period in which fee-related
information has been gathered. Across a recent thirty-two-year
period (1970-2002), the real median rate charged by Oklahoma
14. The Author does not review in this Article any of the research concerning
legal fees done by the consulting firm Altman Weil. Although the firm regularly
surveys lawyers about their billing rates, its subject pool consists of firm "clients and
contacts" and is "probably not representative of the smaller general practice or solo
practitioner office serving individual clients." Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:
How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MicH. L. REV. 953, 957
n.15 (2000).
15. See infra Part IV.
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lawyers rose only 19%, for example, while during a recent
twenty-five-year period in Nebraska (1981-2006), the real median fee rose only 11%. Across a recent eighteen-year period in
Colorado (1982-2000), the real median rate charged by attorneys rose 9%. Between 1965 and 1998 (a thirty-three-year period), the real average fee in Alabama increased 13%. Between
1967 and 1991 (a twenty-four-year period), the real average fee
in Kentucky increased 17%. Fees did not seem to be growing at
an ominously steep rate in any of the fifteen states on which the
Author could gather information.
* Since the mid-1960s, in 2007 inflation-adjusted dollars, the size
of the median or average fee has always been determined by
survey researchers to be above $123 and below $229 in each of
the fifteen states for which data are available. (All real dollar
figures in this Article are stated in constant 2007 dollars. The
year 2007 represents a recent year for which statistics related to
this Article were often available, and inflation since that year
has been modest.) In other words, in these states there is no
evidence that the typical fee has ever fluctuated outside this
$104 range.' 6 The fifteen states are widely dispersed geographically. It seems likely that in much of the United States, standard
fees have fluctuated only within this same real-dollar range.
* Data regarding fees charged by practitioners who provide services to individuals principally or exclusively (such as family lawyers and estate planners) are available." The data show that
such fees tend to be relatively low, that is, they tend to be low in
comparison to the fees charged by lawyers as a whole. Individuals cannot afford to pay the high hourly fees that organizations,
in particular large organizations like corporations and government agencies, typically can. Lawyers obviously know this fact
and act on it in setting fees.
* Longitudinal data are available about the fees charged by lawyers for the work done by the paraprofessionals they employ.
Data have been gathered nationally since 1991 regarding the
typical fee billed by lawyers for work done by paraprofessional
staff members.18 These data show that the median hourly
paralegal billing rate has increased only modestly across time.
Between 1991 and 2010, the billing rate (in inflation-adjusted
2007 dollars) increased from $73 to only $94. Thus, during that
time period, the rate stayed within a $21 "real range."
This surveys contain additional information that relates to the concerns of Americans about lawyer "greed":
* Consumers report that lawyers very frequently do not charge
any fees for legal work.' 9
16. See infra Part IV

TABLES

1-3. The actual range is $124 to $228; thus it is a

$104 range.

17. See infra Part V.A.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See infra Part VII.
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Lawyers report that they frequently fail to collect fees that are
due. 0 They rarely add a service charge or interest to an overdue bill, rarely use collection agencies, and do not use lawsuits as
a primary means to collect a bill. Data from several states suggest that lawyers often negotiate with their clients over unpaid
fees and often reduce fees as an inducement to pay. They often
dun their clients, making simple requests or demands for payment. The next most common approach to handling an unpaid
bill, however, is simply to write it off as a loss.
* Lawyers generally report doing surprisingly impressive amounts
of civic and pro bono work.2 1
*

Fee-related data even shed some light on the claim that fraudulent
over-billing has been a persistent problem. The claim is often made
that the practice has been widespread, severe, and sustained over
many decades. The claim seems implausible on its face, for it suggests
that legal services consumers have been willing over a lengthy period
to pay bills that have included the cost of fraudulently billed sums. If
that has been true, then why have lawyers routinely risked their careers and the possibility of being jailed? They could simply have
charged higher billing rates and charged for hours actually worked.
The data suggest that lawyers could have increased their rates more
rapidly than they have. For most lawyers, it appears that there has
been ample room to increase nominal and real rates without provoking rate "shock" and alienating prospective clients.
Regarding the topic of lawyer income,
* Data concerning the money earnings of lawyers have been published by the United States Census Bureau in Current Population Survey ("CPS") reports since 1982. Data concerning the
money earnings of American workers fifteen years of age and
older have also been published in CPS reports since that time.
The average incomes of lawyers and of United States workers
rose 76% and 41% respectively between 1982 and 2008. Private
practitioners earn higher annual incomes than lawyers generally,
but the difference is not great. This is because private practitioners today constitute three-quarters of the total lawyer population and have constituted the great bulk of the lawyer
population for at least half a century. It is likely that the real
average income of private practitioners has risen roughly 76%
since 1982, which parallels the average income rise of lawyers as
a group. The average annual income of private practitioners
consequently has not soared over the past several decades although it has grown more rapidly than the mean income of other
American workers. As is further discussed below, both logic
and the evidence suggest that the growing income gap between
lawyers and the rest of the working public is not being caused by
20. See infra Part IX.
21. See infra Part VIll.
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significant growth in overbilling by lawyers. The reason that
there is a growing income gap between lawyers and other workers, however, is not clear. Rises and declines in income inequality among worker income cohorts are phenomena that are not
well understood by economists. This is true despite the fact that
most countries of the world are experiencing at least some rising
income inequality, and the problem has been studied extensively. In any case, it appears the growing gap between the average income of lawyers and other Americans is not being caused
by the forms of lawyer greed about which consumers seem most
concerned: overbilling and fee gouging. 22
Regarding the topic of paralegal income,
* Professional organizations began regularly surveying American
paralegals about their incomes only recently. Surveys of the
United States paraprofessional population conducted by the National Association of Legal Assistants show that in the nineteenyear period 1988 through 2010, average paralegal income grew
12%. Census data indicate that the average income of United
States workers fifteen years and older also grew 12%. At least
very recently, the rate of growth of paralegal income has mirrored the rate of growth of worker income generally.23
In sum, research sponsored or conducted by lawyer and paralegal
professional organizations as well as by government agencies suggests
that the average private practitioner is careful to control increases in
the size of his or her own hourly fees as well as the size of fees charged
for the work of paralegals. Further, the average practitioner often
provides free services (including pro bono services), avoids overbearing collection practices, frequently does not collect billed fees, and is
often generous with his or her time doing community service work.
The income increases that have been experienced by the average practitioner and paralegal worker over the past several decades should not
shock anyone's conscience, and the increase in the average lawyer's
income does not seem logically to have been the result of widespread
fraud through overbilling. Altruism is undoubtedly not the only reason that the typical practitioner is careful in his or her business practices and frequently helpful to the members of the community in
which he or she works; however, the term "greedy" is not an apt adjective to use to describe the typical practitioner. Empirical evidence
suggests that lawyers as a group are prudent businesspeople, often
willing for both practical and altruistic reasons to give to their communities and the members of those communities. Market forces as well
as ordinary human decency appear to be functioning perfectly adequately to control the behavior of the average lawyer.
22. See infra Part X (discussing in detail the topic of lawyer income).
23. See infra Part Xl (discussing the growth of paralegal income).
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Inflation and Growth in Dollar Denominated Measures
of Greed

As noted above, this Article discusses lawyer fees, receipts, and incomes across time. Consequently, the effects of inflation have to be
taken into account when evaluating real changes in dollar figures.
Readers should be aware that in the United States over the past halfcentury, substantial inflation has occurred. That inflation is evident in
the movement of the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, the "CPI-U," published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
("BLS").
The CPI-U covers about 87% of the total United States population2 4 and is considered by the BLS to be the "broadest and most
comprehensive" Consumer Price Index ("CPI") published. When
the period 1982 through 1984 is used as the base period,26 the "all
items" CPI-U for 1960 is 29.6,27 the CPI-U for 1970 is 38.8,28 and the
2010 CPI-U is 218.1.29 Thus, the cost of the market basket of goods
and services tracked by the Department of Labor has risen more than
sevenfold during the past five decades; an item or service that cost $10
to purchase in 1960 now costs over $70; and one that cost $13 to buy in
1970 now costs over $70. Dollar figures are sometimes stated in both
nominal and constant (or inflation-adjusted) amounts in this Article.
Again, all real-dollar figures in this Article are stated in constant 2007
dollars. Inflation has been modest since that time, and 2007 represents a year for which statistics related to this Article were often available. Increases that occur over decades in the nominal total of
receipts earned by lawyers, in the nominal standard hourly fee that
lawyers charge, or in nominal average lawyer income can appear very
steep. Real figures should be consulted to determine just how dramatic, or modest, a particular increase has been, however.

24. Consumer Price Index Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTiCs,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm (last modified Oct. 19, 2011). Specifically,

see Question 3 on the webpage: "Whose buying habits does the CPI reflect?"
25. Id. See Question 13: "Which index is the 'official CPI' reported in the media?"
26. Id. See Question 11 on the webpage: "How do I read or interpret an index?"
When the period 1982 through 1984 is used as the base period, the average price of
the CPI market basket of goods and services during that period is set to the number
100. Id. Historically, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has updated the base period from
time to time. However, most currently published BLS CPI indices still use the period
1982-1984 as their base period. Id.
27.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE IN-

(2012), ftp://ftp.bis.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (documenting yearly CPI averages).
DEx, ALL URBAN CONSUMERS

- (CPI-U)

28. Id.
29. Id.
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SERVICES BY INDIVIDUALS

During the past several decades, receipts earned by private law
firms have grown steadily. In 1972, 1982, and 2007 respectively, private practitioners as a group earned $10 billion,"o $34 billion,"1 and
$228 billion in nominal dollars.3 2 The increase in real revenue was less
startling: in constant 2007 dollars in those years., practitioners earned
roughly $50 billion, $73 billion, and, of course, $228 billion. Thus, real
annual revenue increased by about 356% between 1972 and 2007.
Obviously the increase was still quite substantial.
Receipts earned from work done exclusively for individuals have
also grown significantly since 1972; they have not grown as quickly as
total receipts, however. Real receipts from individuals grew from $25
billion in 197211 to $82 billion in 2002,34 a 228% increase. While rising
as an absolute sum over recent years, receipts coming from individuals
(in contrast to those coming from businesses, nonprofit organizations,
government agencies, and other clients) have been falling as a share of
total receipts.
The growth in demand for legal services during the past half century
has been discussed at length elsewhere.3 One of the most thoughtful
analyses concerning the reasons for such growth was written by former dean of Harvard Law School, Robert Clark, in the early 1990s.11
He proposed five principal causes: greater frequency of contact between and among legal actors across international and state borders,
which has led to an increase in transactional as well as other legal
work;3 1 greater diversity, which has caused an upsurge in civil rights,
employment, family law, and housing cases;39 an increase in the nation's level of wealth which has spawned the promulgation of complex
30. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 431, 441 tbl.5
(1989).
31. Id.
32. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 EcoNoMic CENSUS: SECrOR 54 (2007), available
at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
ECN_2007_US_54SSSZ1&prodType=table. See figures concerning "Offices of lawyers, All establishments."
33. Sander & Williams, supra note 30, at 441 tbl.5.
34. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LEGAL SERVICES: 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS 3, tbl.3
(2004) [hereinafter LEGAL SERVICES: 2002], available at http://www.census.gov/prodl
ec02/ec0254i01.pdf.
35. See Sander & Williams, supra note 30 (showing in 1972 and 1982 respectively,
52.5% and 44.5% of practitioner revenue was paid by individuals). In 2002, individuals paid 41.4% of practitioner revenue. LEGAL SERVICES: 2002, supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalization Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV 1 (1992).

37. Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61
HAM

FORD-

L. REV. 275 (1992).

38. Id. at 288-90.
39. Id. at 290-91.
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social welfare legislation and the need for enforcement measures; 40
greater human "involvement" in large-scale formal organizations such
as corporations and government agencies, which has led to certain
economies in the purchase of legal services;41 and finally, "greater mobility and interconnectedness of . .. populations," which has made it
"less costly . . . to escape from informal social groups and their infor-

mal methods of social control" and in turn led to the use of law as a
method of ordering human relations.4 2
Undoubtedly, other causes also exist. It is not the purpose of this
Article to explain the causes of the growth in demand for legal services, however. It is to discuss the response of lawyers to growth in
demand by individuals and lawyers' alleged greed. As the demand for
legal services has grown, public sentiment about lawyer motivation in
the conduct of their work has grown increasingly negative.
III.

ALLEGED LAWYER GREED

It is no exaggeration to say that members of the public are deeply
concerned about lawyer greed. Over the past two decades, more than
half of all Americans in polls sponsored by the organized bar have
agreed with the following statements: "lawyers are greedy," 43 "lawyers make too much money,"4 4 "it is fair to say that lawyers charge
excessive fees,"4 5 and "lawyers are more interested in making money
than in serving their clients."4 6 In response to a 1998 American Bar
Association ("ABA") poll conducted to measure attitudes toward the
United States justice system, 37% of those polled strongly disagreedor
disagreed with the unarguable statement, "Some costs for lawyers' services are warranted."4 7
40. Id. at 291-92, 294.
41. Id. at 295-97.
42. Id. at 298.
43. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi - The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll,

A.B.A. J. Sept. 1993, at 60, 63 (stating that 59% agree).
44. Id. (stating that 63% agree).
45. Id. (stating that 55% agree).
46. LEO J. SHAPIRO, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS 7 (2002), available at
http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate/publicperceptionsl.pdf (showing
that 69% agree). Leo J. Shapiro and Associates conducted two polls. Id. The first
was conducted in April 2001 with a "nationally representative sample of 450 U.S.
households, with the head of the household reporting for household . . ."; the second

was conducted in January 2002 with "a nationally representative sample of 300 households . . ." Id. at 2-3. See also Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of
Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805,

808-09 (1998) (stating that in 1984 in a Gordon Black/USA Today survey done using
a national sample of adults, 61% of respondents expressed the view that lawyers
charge unreasonable fees while 56% indicated that lawyers recommend more legal
work than is actually required).
47, M/A/R/C RESEARCH, AM. BAR Ass'N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE
SYSTEM

71 (1999).
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Further, Americans' views concerning lawyer avarice seem to be
turning more unfavorable with the passage of time. Certainly, individual American consumers who have used lawyers have become increasingly dissatisfied with the sums that they have been charged for the
work done for them. During 1973 and 1974, the American Bar Association and American Bar Foundation jointly sponsored a survey of
the American public that concerned routine legal needs and how
those needs are met.4 8 Each respondent who had previously used a
lawyer was asked to rate the lawyer most recently used 49 on the basis
of a set of selected characteristics. On the characteristic of "being fair
and reasonable in charging for .. . services," only 7% rated their lawyer "poor," while most gave their lawyer the rating of "excellent"
(56%) or "good" (26%).5o By the 1980s, however, consumer views of
the reasonableness of lawyer fees had soured considerably; in 1986, in
answer to a question posed by the National Law Journal as part of a
telephone poll, about a quarter (23%) of Americans who had previously hired lawyers stated those lawyers "had charged too much."5 1
And by the 1990s, consumers had become very unhappy. During a
1993 National Law Journal poll, a stunning 43% of respondents who
had used attorneys stated they had been overcharged.5 2 Given the
negative sentiments about lawyer greed expressed by Americans during the past two decades, there is no reason to believe that consumers
who have used lawyers have become any more accepting since the
1990s of the fees they have been asked to pay.
Negative public views about lawyers' impulses concerning money
should not be dismissed by the profession as silly and unimportant.
Such views are clearly important to the people who hold them. Today,
the charge of lawyer greed is one of the principal complaints people
lodge against the profession. Reports of two of the national surveys
sponsored by bar organizations in the past twenty years have listed
lawyer greed as one of only four principal areas of public concern

48. See BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977).

NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL

49. Id. at 199. Curran reported that "[e]ighty-seven percent of the lawyer users
had their most recent case consultation with a lawyer after 1960." Id. That is, within
thirteen to fourteen years from the time that survey data was collected.
50. Id. at 210.
51. Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up; But NLJ/West Poll Also Shows

More People are Using Attorneys, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1, 22. In the same poll,
each respondent was asked which from among five characterizations specifically offered most closely represented his view of the most negative aspects of lawyers. In
descending order of frequency, respondents chose the following characterizations:
"too interested in money" (chosen by 31%); "file too many unnecessary lawsuits"
(chosen by 27%); "manipulate the legal system without regard for right or wrong"
(chosen by 26%); "too interested in representing corporations, not people" (chosen
by 8%); and just "hired guns" (chosen by 3%). Id. at 4.
52. Id.
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about lawyer motivation and behavior." Also, when thinking about
lawyers, the supposed "fact" that lawyers are greedy is close to the
surface of Americans' thought processes. This is made clear in the
answers they give when asked to volunteer impressions of lawyers. In
the free response portion of an ABA poll taken in 1992, for example,
members of the public were asked to describe both favorable and unfavorable impression of lawyers. The two most frequently volunteered negative impressions were that lawyers are too expensive (an
opinion that was volunteered by 17%) and that they are "greedy" or
"money hungry" (stated by 11 %).54 Further, of the concerns that people have about the legal representation that they have received, concerns about fees are foremost. The report of a 2002 study sponsored
by the ABA Section of Litigation that includes a review of comments
about the image of lawyers made by Americans who attended focus
groups explains as follows:
Of all the criticisms that consumers [who have previously hired lawyers] raise about their personal experiences with lawyers, the greatest number of complaints arises around lawyers' fees. Consumers
say that lawyers charge too much for their services; are often not
upfront about their fees; and are unwilling to account for their
charges or hours .

. .

. No one legal specialty is singled out for

overcharging. Consumers complain about fees charged by all types
of lawyers.
Consumers who have used lawyers often believe that high fees are
inescapable; lay people simply cannot do legal work on their own and
have to turn to lawyers who they believe inevitably charge high sums.
Some specific comments made by focus group members include the
following:
I was very impressed (with the work the lawyer did for me), but
shocked at the charges because I did not realize they bill you for
every little minute. The overall complete thing was wonderful, but
we paid out the nose to get all the estate trust settled. But, it's not
something that a normal person can do, and there are all kinds of
rules and regulations.5 6
The last time we bought a house, the real estate attorney did absolutely nothing. But, she got this huge commission because there
53. Compare Hengstler, supra note 43, at 62 ("Public complaints about lawyers
generally can be placed into four categories - [a] perception that lawyers lack caring
and compassion; a perception of poor ethical standards and enforcement; a view that
lawyers are greedy; and an apparent distaste for lawyer advertising."), with SHAPIRO,
supra note 46, at 7 ("Consumers have four central criticisms of lawyers. The public
says that lawyers are greedy; lawyers are manipulative; lawyers are corrupt; and that
the legal profession does a poor job of policing itself.").
54. See Hengstler,supra note 43, at 63. See also Ross Laguzza, The Lawyer Image
Study: Some SurprisingResults About Texans' Opinions of Lawyers, 54 TEX. B. J. 485
(1991).
55. SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 14-15.
56. Id. at 14.
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were only things that she could do, and we couldn't do it on our
own. 57
You normally need a lawyer when you have a problem, and you
associate them with problems. And, the deeper your problem, the
more that you need them, and the more expensive they are going to
become."5

Such remarks appear to voice upset over the supposed monopolization of the field of law by lawyers and the high prices for routine services that monopolization has allowed. No doubt, to such people,
lawyer exploitation of their seeming helplessness is particularly
galling.
Finally, it is important to note, as stated above, the view that lawyers are greedy appears to be the principal reason that members of
the public avoid soliciting professional legal help. The average American believes that legal services are too costly due in significant part to
lawyer greed, and it is clear that many believe that greed spawns the
desire to hide fee-related information from clients. Many Americans
complain that lawyers do not warn clients about the size of likely future fees and that they frequently fail to explain, and thus account for,
the fees that are charged." Some say that lawyers both delay cases
and assign more staff members than necessary in order to pad bills.60
Others complain that lawyers promise results that cannot be delivered, 61 apparently simply to secure fees. The real or presumed cost of
representation is the principal reason that Americans with unsolved
legal problems do not seek legal help.6 2 To avoid the anxiety associated with working with lawyers (anxiety that is related to views about
lawyer greed), many Americans who need help avoid contact with
them.63
It is clear that public concern about alleged lawyer greed is not confined to concern about fees charged to businesses and the incomes
that lawyers earn from corporate practice. Nor is it limited additionally to upset over the size of lawyer fees recovered in celebrated tort
cases. In substantial part, it represents concern about the greed
Americans believe is evident in the manner lawyers treat ordinary
people.
The nature of public concern gives rise to questions concerning lawyer behavior and possible changes in lawyer behavior across time.
How high are the fees that are currently charged to Americans for
routine services? Have fees risen steeply with the rise in demand for
services across the past several decades? Are sharp or unduly aggres57. Id. at 15.

58. Id. at 14.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 15.
61. Id. at 16.
62. See Curran, supra note 2, at 82.
63. SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 23-24.
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sive billing practices employed today to collect high legal bills, and are
the incomes of lawyers who serve the public unconscionably high?
The heart of this Article begins with an exploration of the fees that
lawyers charge.
IV.

SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE STANDARD HouRLY LAWYER FEE

Today, it is impossible to know the size of average fixed and contingent fees charged for routine legal services, including those charged
just four to five decades ago. Information about such fees was rarely
gathered and certainly was not gathered systematically on a national
scale. Today, it is still difficult to find publicly available information
about these sorts of fees. It is possible to know something about the
standard fees that lawyers have been charging for work done on an
hourly basis during roughly the past four decades in many specific
states, however. This is because during that time period, various state
bar associations have been conducting "economic surveys" seeking information from the lawyers that the associations represent. Economic
surveys typically gather information about the number of hours
worked by lawyers per week, month, or year; office staff size; methods
of record keeping; the incomes of lawyers; use of technology by lawyers; and other office-management related topics. Because they are
simply surveys, they represent snapshots of lawyer economic life in
the years in which they are undertaken. Many states gather information irregularly. For example, a bar association may circulate one survey instrument in a specific year, another instrument seven years later,
and a third three years after that. Additionally, bar associations often
fail to retain reports summarizing survey results, and thus, survey reports can be hard to locate.
However, the Author was able to obtain a number of reports from
bar associations as well as to find journal articles referring to specific
results. The Author located sources of information concerning fifteen
jurisdictions.
Each of the sources the Author located contains data about the fees
charged by private practitioners. State bar associations in the fifteen
jurisdictions have periodically asked practitioners whether they ever
charge on an hourly fee basis and if they do, what size fee they most
typically, or most frequently, charge. Each association has then published some or all of the following information: (1) the median fee
reported by all practitioners; (2) the average fee reported by all practitioners; and (3) the median or average fee reported by selected practitioner subgroups-subgroups such as sole practitioners, lawyers
working in firms, partners in firms, firm associates, and practitioners
working in large cities. Bar associations differ in the ways they report
the gathered information. One association will report the standard
fee charged in its state as an exact median or average number (e.g.,
$156), while another will report the standard fee using a fee range
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($151-$160, for example). One association will report fee size by
"number of years lawyer has been licensed"; another will not do so,
and so forth. Even a single bar association will sometimes summarize
fee data differently in one report than it has summarized data in all
previously published reports. A bar association might report a median hourly fee for all private practitioners one year, even though it
has previously reported only the average size of fees, for example.
The reports are limited in their usefulness as sources of data about the
movement in the size of fees across time. Still, the Author was able to
create an estimate of the gradual movement of fee size in each state
considered. Some useful information about each state was available
in the collection of reports that the Author consulted.
The three tables below provide information about median and average fees charged by lawyers or subgroups of lawyers across varying
lengthy periods in fifteen states. The states are widely dispersed geographically. The first two of the three tables list median fees. The
third table displays average fees. In a survey report, when a jurisdiction's median fee has been reported as a fee range, both that range
and the midpoint of the range are provided in the tables. The total
percentage increase in fee size for each data set was derived by making a simple comparison of the most remote and the most recent fee
reported in the state in question. By necessity, the midpoints of fee
ranges were sometimes used to estimate the total increase or decrease
in a state's fee size. It appears that researchers have never analyzed
longitudinal data about fee size contained in bar sponsored economic
surveys.
A number of things are noteworthy about the information in the
tables.
The real median or real average fee in a state typically both rises
and falls as years go by, presumably with the economic circumstances
of the state and therefore the economic circumstances of clients. Reductions as well as increases in the real standard fee charged are common. The real standard fee drops between at least two of the years in
which surveys were taken in nine of the fifteen states. The size of the
real median fee charged in one state, Michigan, seesawed throughout
a recent thirty-one year period (1972-2003) both rising and falling. It
ultimately ended lower than it had been at the start of that lengthy
period. It is well known that Michigan has suffered economic difficulties for many decades. In every other state over the total time that
information about fees has been gathered by a bar association, the
real median or real average fee has risen, however.
While nominal median and average fees have increased markedly
across the past four to five decades in the states for which information
is available, real fees have only increased modestly. Of course, this is
because inflation has also been substantial. The average compounded
rate of yearly increase in the real median or average fee is typically
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below (and often well below) 1% per year. Across a recent thirty-two
year period (1970-2002), the real median rate charged by Oklahoma
lawyers rose only 19%, while across a thirty-year period (1975-2005),
the real average rate charged by Wisconsin lawyers increased 18%.
Between 1981 and 2006 (a twenty-five year period) in Nebraska, the
real median fee rose only 11%. Across a recent eighteen-year period
in Colorado (1982-2000), the real median rate charged by attorneys
rose 9%. The largest increase calculated across any lengthy period
(i.e., a period of more than a single decade) was calculated for Missouri lawyers. Real fees charged specifically for trial work in the state
increased 40% across the twenty-three year period (1982-1995). Even
so, the compounded annual rate of increase in the trial work fee in
Missouri was 1.5%, and during the same twenty-three year period, the
increase in Missouri in the real median fee charged for legal work
done in lawyers' offices was only 22%.
During the past four to five decades in 2007 inflation-adjusted dollars, real median, as well as real average, hourly fees in the states examined (and therefore in much of the rest of the United States, one
can safely assume) have ranged between $1241 and $228. There is no
evidence that the real median or average fee has ever equaled or exceeded $228, in any of these states, or ever been lower than $124.
Thus, fees have fluctuated in a fairly narrow "real range" across the
states as a whole.

64. But see infra TABLE 2 (showing the real median fee charged by Mississippi
lawyers for non-trial work in 1970 is $123; however, this amount does not represent
the median fee charged by all lawyers across all cases).
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1:

NOMINAL MEDIAN AND REAL MEDIAN HOURLY FEES CHARGED BY
ALL PRACTITIONERS CHARGING HOURLY FEES IN SELECTED
JURISDICTIONS, 1960-2007
Sources: Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas economic survey reports.

-

MICHIGAN 65

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1972

$40

$198

1984

$75

$150

1988

$92

$161

1991

$105

$160

1994

$125

$175

1997

$125

$161

2000

$150

$181

2003

$170

Increase/Decrease Across
31 Years

325%

$192
-3.0%

Compounded Average
Annual Increase/Decrease

4.8%

-0.01%

65. John P. Henderson & Maurice Weinrobe, The Economics of Law Practice in
Michigan (Centerfold Pullout), 53 MICH. B.J. 1, 8 (1974); John M. Wright, 1984 State

Bar of Michigan Economics Survey (pts. 1-3), 64 MICH. B.J. 1186, 1306 (1985); State
Bar of Mich., The 1988 Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law Practice in
Michigan, 67 MIcH. B.J. 3, 22 (1988) [hereinafter MicH. 1988 DESKTOP REFERENCE];
State Bar of Mich., The 1991 Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law Practicein
Michigan, 70 MIcH. B.J. 1223, 1231, 1233 (1991); State Bar of Mich., Economics
Survey: The Economics of Law Practice in Michigan, 73 MIcH. B.J. 1219, 1225, 1227
(1994); State Bar of Mich., The 1997 Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law
Practicein Michigan, 76 MicH. B.J. 1309 (1997); State Bar of Mich., The 2000 Desktop
Reference on the Economics of Law Practice in Michigan, 79 MicH. B.J. 1545 (2000);
Lawrence H. Stiffman, A Snapshot of the Economic Status of Attorneys in Michigan:
Excerpts from the 2003 Economics of Law PracticeSurvey, 82 MIcH. B.J. 20 (2003).
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66

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1982

$66 ($61-$70)

$142 ($131-$150)

1985

$76 ($71-$80)

$146 ($137-$154)

1988

$101 ($91-$110)

$177 ($159-$193)

1990

$101 ($91-sio)

$160 ($144-$174)

1992

$101 ($91-$110)

$149 ($134-$163)

1994

$121 ($111-$130)

$169 ($155-$182)

1997

$121 ($111-$130)

$156 ($143-$168)

1999

$126 ($116-$135)

$157 ($144-$168)

2001

$138 ($126-$150)

$162 ($147-$176)

2003

$138 ($126-$150)

$155 ($142-$169)

2005

$163 ($151-$175)

$173 ($160-$186)

Increase Across 23 Years

146%

22%

Compounded Average
Annual Increase

4.0%

0.9%

- MISSOURI (TRIAL WORK) _67

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1982

$66 ($61-$70)

$142 ($131-$150)

1985

$76 ($71-$80)

$146 ($137-$154)

1988

$101 ($91-$110)

$177 ($159-$193)

1990

$101 ($91-$110)

$160 ($144-$174)

1992

$101 ($91-$110)

$149 ($134-$163)

1994

$121 ($111-$130)

$169 ($155-$182)

1997

$121 ($111-$130)

$156 ($143-$168)

1999

$126 ($116-$135)

$157 ($144-$168)

2001

$138 ($126-$150)

$162 ($147-$176)

2003

$138 ($126-$150)

$155 ($142-$169)

2005

$188 ($176-$200)

$199 ($187-$212)

Increase Across 23 Years

185%

40%

Compounded Average
Annual Increase

4.7%

1.5%

66.
Mo.

THE

BAR,

Mo.

2005

BAR, 2003 ECONOMIC SURVEY REPORT 25,
MISSOURI BAR ECONOMIC SURVEY RESULTs

31, app. 3 (2003);
36 (2005).

THE

67. See sources cited supra note 66.
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- NEBRASKA 68
Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1981

$56 ($51-$60)

$128 ($116-$137)

1985

$66 ($61-$70)

$127 ($118-$135)

1989

$83 ($76-$90)

$139 ($127-$150)

1994

$91 ($81-$100)

$127 ($113-$140)

2003

$113 ($101-$125)

$127 ($114-$141)

2006

$138 ($126-$150)

$142 ($130-$154)

Increase Across 25 Years

146%

11%

Compounded Average
Annual Increase

3.7%

0.4%

- OHIO -69

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1990

$100

$159

2001

$150

$176

2004

$175

$192

2007
Increase Across 17 Years

$185
85%

$185
16%

Compounded Average
Annual Increase

3.7%

0.9%

- OKLAHOMA -

1970

Nominal Median Fee
$25

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)
$134

1982

$73 ($61-$85)

$157 ($131-$183)

Year

1992

$103

$152

2002
Increase Across 32 Years

$138 ($126-$150)
452%

$159 ($145-$173)

CompoundedAverage
Annual Increase

5.5%

0.5%

19%

68. NEB. STATE BAR Ass'N, 2003 ECONOMIC SURVEY (2003); NEB. STATE BAR
Ass'N, 2006 ECONOMIC SURVEY (2006).
69. OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N, THE 1990 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS
OF LAw PRACTICE IN OHIO (1990); SOLO, SMALL FIRM & GEN. PRACTICE SECTION,
OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN OHIO, DESKTOP
REFERENCE FOR 2007 (2007), available at https://www.ohiobar.org/General%20
Resources/pub/2007_Economics ofLawPracticejinOhio.pdf.
70. Billie Bethel, Report of the 1970 Economic Survey of the Oklahoma Bar
Association, 41 OKLA. B.J. 2853, 2872 (1970); Billie Bethel, Report of the 1982
Informationaland Service Survey of the Oklahoma Bar Association, 54 OKLA. B.J. 223
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OREGON 71

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1994

$120

$168

1998

$130

$165

2002

$165

$190

IncreaseAcross 8 Years

38%

13%

Compounded Average
Annual Increase

4.1%

1.5%

- TEXAS 72

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1967

$28 ($25-$30)

$174 ($155-$186)

1981

$68 ($61-$75)

$155 ($139-$171)

1989

$117

$196

2000

$175

$211

2003

$200

$225

2005

$215

$228

Increase Across 38 Years

668%

31%

Compounded A verage
Annual Increase

5.5%

0.7%

(1983); Mark Payton et al., 2002 Oklahoma Bar Association Membership Survey
Report, Okla. Bar Ass'n, 73 OKLA. B.J. 3395, 3416 (2002), available at www.okbar.org/

news/obj2002dec7.pdf; Charles L. "Bo" Monnot, III, 1992 Oklahoma Bar Association
Survey, 63 OKLA. B.J. 3540, 3563 (1992).
71. OR. STATE BAR, OREGON STATE BAR 1994 ECONOMIC SURVEY (1995); OR.
STATE BAR, OREGON STATE BAR 2002 ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 (2002).
72. DEP'T OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, STATE BAR OF TEX., HOURLY RATES IN
2005 REPORT 2 (2006), available at http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?

Section=Demographicand_.Economic Trends&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentlD=8820; DEP'T OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, STATE BAR OF TEX., HOURLY
RATES IN 2003 REPORT 2 (2005), available at http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Archives&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=1 1483;
DEP'T OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, STATE BAR OF TEX., 2001 HOURLY RATE REPORT
11 (2001), available at http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Archives&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=1 1530; J. Harris Morgan,
Membership Questionnaire:An Analysis of the Results, 44 TEX. B.J. 908 (1981); Billie
Bethel, Report of the 1967 Economic Survey of the State Bar of Texas, 31 TEX. B.J. 9

(1968).
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TABLE

2:

NOMINAL MEDIAN AND REAL MEDIAN HOURLY FEES CHARGED BY
SUBGROUPS OF PRACTITIONERS, CHARGED IN SPECIFIC
CIRCUMSTANCES, OR CHARGED BY ALL LAWYERS CHARGING HOURLY
FEES IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, 1960-2007
Sources: Colorado, Iowa, Mississippi, and Montana economic survey reports.

- COLORADO -7

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1967: Denver Lawyers

$25

$155

1967: Non-Denver Lawyers

$23

$143

1982: All Lawyers

$80

$172

2000: All Lawyers

$155

$187

IncreaseAcross 18 Yr.

94%

9%

3.7%

0.5%

Period1982-2000*
CompoundedAverage
Annual IncreaseAcross
Period 1982-2000*
*

All-lawyers-all-cases comparablemedians exist only for 1982 and 2000.

- IOWA 74

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1985: Trial Work

$75 ($70-$79)

$145 ($135-$152)

1985: Non-trial Work

$75 ($70-$79)

$145 ($135-$152)

1990: Trial Work

$95 ($90-$99)

$151 ($143-$157)

1990: Non-trial Work

$85 ($80-$89)

$135 ($127-$141)

2000: All Work

$125

$151

2006: All Work

$143 ($136-$150)

$147($140-$154)

Increase/DecreaseAcross
6 Year Period2000-2006*

14%

-2.6%

CompoundedAverage
Annual Increase/Decrease

2.2 %

-0.4%

Across Period

2000-2006*

*All-lawyers-all-casescomparablemedians exist only for 2000 and 2006.
73. The Colorado Survey - 1967, 10 LAW OFFICE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT

215 (1969-1970); Summary of 1982 CBA Economic Survey Results, 12 COLO. LAW.
741 (1983); COLO. BAR Ass'N, COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION 2000 ECONOMIC
SURVEY 32 (2001) [hereinafter COLo. 2000 ECONOMIC SURVEY].
74. IOWA STATE BAR Ass'N, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN IOWA - 2006
(2006) [hereinafter IOWA ECONOMIC SURVEY 2006], availableat http://isba.affiniscape
IOWA STATE BAR
.com/associations/4664/files/2006%20Economic%20Survey.pdf;
ASS'N, 1985 ECONOMICS SURVEY (1985) (on file with author); PHILIP A. HOULE, THE
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- MISSISSIPPI -75

1970: Trial Work

Nominal Median Fee
$28 ($26-$30)

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)
$150 ($139-$160)

1970: Non-Trial Work

$23($21-$25)

$123 ($112-$134)

1997: Partners &
Shareholders

$129

$167

1997: Sole Practitioners

$112

$145

2005: Partners &
Shareholders

$186

$197

Year

2005: Sole Practitioners
$162
$172
*There are no all-lawyer-all-casesmedians that would allow a calculation of a meaningfid
nominal or real increase across any period of time.

- MONTANA

76

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1993: Senior Partners*

$88 ($76-$100)

$126 ($109-$144)

1993: Associates*
2004-05: All Lawyers*

$88 ($76-$100)
$138 ($126-$150)

$126 ($109-$144)
$149 ($136-$162)

*There is no all-lawyer-all-cases median for 1993 that would allow a calculation of a
meaningful nominal or real increase across the period 1993-2004. The numbers in the
Montana table are not inconsistent with the data in other state tables, however.

1990 ECONOMICS SURVEY OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1991); IOWA
STATE BAR ASS'N, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN IOWA IN 2001, at 12 (2001).
75. Miss. STATE BAR Ass'N, MIssIssIPPI STATE BAR ECONOMIC STUDY 1970/71
(1971); HORNE CPA GROUP, 1993 LAW FIRM ECONOMIC SURVEY (1993). The letter

of transmittal from the Horne CPA Group to the Mississippi Bar included in the
report is dated 1993. Id.
76. STATE BAR OF MONT., LAW PRACTICE COMMITTEE, 1993 ECONOMIC SURVEY
OF MONTANA LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS (1993); STATE BAR OF MONT., Membership
Survey: Part II, What We Earn-Compensationfor Montana's Lawyers, MONT.
May 2005 at 5, 6 [hereinafter MONT. 2005 ECONOMIC SURVEY].
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TABLE

3:

NOMINAL AVERAGE AND REAL AVERAGE HOURLY FEES CHARGED BY
ALL PRACTITIONERS CHARGING HOURLY FEES IN SELECTED
JURISDICTIONS, 1960-2007

- ALABAMA -7

Real Average Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1965

Nominal Average Fee
$22

1978

$51

$162

1986

$75

$142

1998

$129

$164

IncreaseAcross 33 Years
CompoundedAverage
Annual Increase

486%

13%

5.5%

0.4%

Year

- KANSAS

$145

-

Year

Nominal Average Fee

Real Average Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1997

$113

$146

2005

$167

$177

Increase Across 8 Years
Compounded Average
Annual Increase

48%

21%

5.0%

2.4%

-

KENTUCKY -

Year

Nominal Average Fee

Real Average Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1967
1991

$20
$95

$124
$145

IncreaseAcross 24 Years
CompoundedAverage
Annual Increase

375%

17%

6.7%

0.7%

77. The Economics of Law Practicein Alabama, 29 ALA. LAW. 6 (1968); WILLIAM
M.

KIMMELMAN, DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF ALABAMA LAWYERS, 1978: A REPORT

TO THE ALABAMA STATE BAR (1979); Samuel H. Fisher III et al., A Survey of
Alabama Lawyers: 1986, 48 ALA. LAw 160 (1987); ALA. STATE BAR, SURVEY OF
LAWYERS IN ALABAMA

28 (1998).

78. 1997 Economic Survey of Kansas Lawyers, 66 J. KAN. B. Ass'N. E-1 (1997);
KAN. BAR Ass'N, THE EcoNoMics OF LAW PRACTICE IN KANSAS IN 2005 (2006).

79.

Ky. BAR Ass'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE MEMBERSHIP: 1977 ECONOMIC AND

OPINION SURVEY (1977); Ky. Bar Ass'n, 1991 Economic Survey: An Economic
Analysis of Kentucky's Lawyers and Law Firms, 56 Ky. BENCH & BAR 57 (1992)

(survey report is appended to issue and has its own page numbering system).
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- WISCONSIN -80

Year

Nominal Average Fee

Real Average Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1975*

$42

$153

1983

$70

$146

1987

$88

$161

1992

$116

$171

2001

$146

$171

2005

$171

$181

Increase Across 30 Years

307%

18%

Compounded Average
Annual Increase

5.1%

0.6%

*The survey was conducted after October 24, 1975, and before August 1976.

One might argue that the real hourly fees charged by lawyers have
always been high if one considers fees in the range of $124 to $228 an
hour high, given the costs associated with maintaining a law office, the
years of education required of lawyers, the complexity of casework,
and the stress of adversarial conflict. But, given the numbers just reviewed, it is hard to argue that lawyers in the states examined have
been exploiting the desperation of Americans and greedily boosting
fees as demand for legal services has increased. Typical increases of
typical fees in the states about which we have comprehensive information have been measured and gradual.
V.
A.

THE HOURLY FEES CHARGED TO INDIVIDUAL CONSUMERS
FOR ROUTINE LEGAL SERVICES

The Legal Services Most Needed by American Consumers

In any given year, many lawyers represent more than one type of
entity. Lawyers represent individuals, trusts, government agencies,
businesses, and non-profit organizations. Individuals seeking representation from lawyers who serve diverse client populations commonly have to "bid" against wealthier consumers in order to actually
secure legal help; individuals compete with wealthier clients for legal
talent. The hourly fees charged to individuals are undoubtedly higher
than they otherwise would be in the absence of this economic fact.
80. Results of Economic Survey, 49 Wis. B. BULL. 47 (1976); Adrian P. Schoone,
Presidents Perspective: Membership Survey Helps to Fill Information Gap, 56 Wis. B.
BULL. 5 (1983); Survey Reveals: Little Time Spent on Client Development, 61 Wis. B.
BULL. 23 (1988); BECKY WEINER, WISCONSIN STATE BAR 1992 ECONOMICS OF
PRACTICE SURVEY REPORT (1992); Dianne Molvig, 1998 Member Survey: Gauging
Members' Needs, 71 Wis. LAW. 18 (1998); Dianne Molvig, The Economics of
Practicing Law: A 2001 Snapshot, 74 Wis. LAw. 6 (2001); Dianne Molvig, The
Economics of Practicing Law: A 2005 Snapshot: Sizing Up Your Business Practices, 79

no.2 (2006), http://www.wisbar.org/am/template.cfm?section=currrent
issuel&template=/cm/contentdisplay.cfm&contentid=59706.
Wis. LAWYER,
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Because much of the bidding that individuals do for legal help is
against other and wealthier types of entities, it might be assumed that
the average (or median) fee charged by lawyers in a given locale during a given period of time to all clients constitutes a fair approximation
of the average (or median) fee charged to individuals. In fact, it is
very likely a fair approximation. But any such approximation can be
refined. It will always, or virtually always, be at least somewhat too
high. Any such approximation can be refined through the use of information about the prices charged by specialists in any locale at issue
who concentrate on the legal problems faced by individuals. Data
gathered by economic-survey researchers in a number of jurisdictions
regarding the hourly fees charged by specialists are available. The
prices charged by "public-needs-oriented" specialists, specialists who
concentrate on the needs of individuals, are typically lower than prices
charged by attorneys as a group. In addressing the area of prices
charged by specialists, this Article begins by discussing research concerning the legal services needed by individual Americans.
The most comprehensive survey of the legal needs of Americans
published to date was conducted by the American Bar Association
(specifically the Special Committee of the ABA to Survey the Legal
Needs of the Public) in cooperation with the American Bar Foundation under the direction of Barbara Curran. The survey, which was
conducted in 1973 and 1974, will be referred to as the "Curran Study"
throughout the rest of this Article. The study has already been mentioned, although not by name, in the main text of Section III regarding
alleged lawyer greed.
The results of the Curran Study have been reported in book-length
form." The study systematically examines, and draws conclusions
about, the types of problems individual Americans bring to lawyers.
Curran and her staff conducted interviews with 2,064 persons82 in
households randomly chosen throughout the United States, 3 and they
posed questions concerning both the types of legal problems that
household residents had previously encountered and the actions that
had been undertaken to address those problems. They specifically
asked participants whether household members had ever used the
help of lawyers to address legal problems.84 To help study subjects
better remember the past, batteries of questions were asked about
particular types of problems individuals commonly bring to lawyers.
The Curran staff asked participants to answer questions about

81. See CURRAN, supra note 48. See id. at xxvii, for a summary of the study's
history.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 33-34.
84. Id. at 99.
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problems in ten major areas. One such area was real property, for
example. With regard to that area, respondents were asked whether
they had ever encountered, and what they had done to handle,
problems involving acquisition of property, interference with property
ownership, and disputes with home builders, repair contractors, and
mortgagees." Another area about which questions were specifically
asked was that of "consumer matters." With regard to consumer matters, respondents were asked about possible disputes with landlords,
creditors, and goods-and-service providers; additionally, they were
asked about problems such as eviction, garnishment, repossession of
personal property, and so on.8
Curran and her staff found that people most frequently had encountered problems in the areas of real property law ("over 50% of the
population" had previously encountered "at least one real property
problem"), torts (50% had faced a problem or problems involving tort
law), and consumer law (27% had had serious consumer problems).
"Between 10% and 25% of the population" had faced problems in the
areas of "government matters" (specifically, difficulties with municipal, state, or federal government agencies), "marital" matters, and
employment problems. Many had had problems relating to estate law
(23% had tried to do estate planning and 10% had faced the death of
a spouse), and less than 10% had confronted problems involving the
need for adult or juvenile criminal defense or involving violations of
"constitutional rights.""
The researchers separately examined the types of problems that had
actually been taken to lawyers by individuals. Of all such problems,
ones relating to real property, wills, estates and trusts ("mostly wills"),
and marital difficulty dominated (in that specific order of problem
type). They were the problem types most frequently seen by lawyers
representing individuals. Lawyers handled tort problems next most
frequently (in particular, tort problems concerning "personal injury
and property damage relating to automobile accidents"). Together
these problem types constituted the core problem areas of public
need. The cases next most likely to involve a lawyer were consumer
problems, matters involving government, employment matters, and
criminal defense.89
It is unlikely that the legal needs of the public have changed dramatically since the Curran Study. Very recent research concerning
lawyer specialization indicates that the same core set of legal
85. Id. at 102 (stating that questions concerning eleven major areas were asked).
The Author conflates the purportedly separate areas of estate planning and estate
settlement into one area: estate law.
86. Id. at 102-04.
87. Id. Obviously, disputes with landlords and eviction-related matters could have
been labeled real property problems by Curran's staff but were not.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 196-97.
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problems is being handled by the private bar today that was being
handled in the 1970s. Lawyers answering economic surveys are sometimes asked by bar associations to list their primary fields of practice
or concentration. The definition of primary field normally revolves
around either the amount of income derived from work in a field or
the amount of time spent on such work. Sometimes for example, a
field is "primary" if, from among the fields in which a lawyer practices, it constitutes one of the lawyer's highest sources of income. 90
Alternatively, if work in a field consumes 25% or more of a lawyer's
time, the lawyer might be considered to be a specialist in the field. 9'
Or a field might constitute a specialty if it is among the three fields on
which the lawyer spends the most time. 9 2 Survey reports often contain a table that displays a list of fields and the number of lawyers who
identified each field listed as a specialty. The lists allow one to determine the fields of practice that provide the most work to lawyers. Economic surveys conducted since the year 2000 in Colorado, Illinois,
Iowa, Ohio, and Michigan all indicate that among the many specialty
fields that involve work performed for individuals, the fields of family
law, estate law, real property, and plaintiff's torts work are by far the
fields most commonly pursued by lawyers. Trailing behind are those
fields having to do with the areas of civil rights, private adult and juvenile criminal defense," debtor-related bankruptcy work, education
and school law, elder law/public benefits/and ERISA law, employment law (done on behalf of labor), tax work done for individuals and
small businesses, and representation of workers in worker's compensation cases.9 4
B.

The Size of Fees Charged by Specialists in Fields of Practice
Serving the Needs of the Public

When state bar associations publish information about fees charged
by various types of specialists, they normally publish information that
relates at most to only several dozen specialties. They do not report
90. CoLo. 2000 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 73, at 13; THE ECONOMICS OF
IN IOWA IN 2001, supra note 74, at 12; The 2000 Desktop Reference on
the Economics of Law Practice in Michigan, supra note 65, at 1551; THE ECONOMICS
LAW PRACTICE

OF LAW PRACTICE IN OHIO, DESKTOP REFERENCE FOR 2007,
91. 2001 HOURLY RATE REPORT, supra note 72, at 11.
92. MONT. 2005 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 76, at 6.

93. In contrast to criminal defense

supra note 69,

at

13.

handled by publicly funded defender

organizations.

94. See COLo. 2000 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 73, at 14; THE ECONOMICS OF
LAW PRACTICE IN IOWA IN 2001, supra note 74, at 13; THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN OHIO, DESKTOP REFERENCE FOR 2007, supra note 69, at 13; The 2000 Desktop
Reference on the Economics of Law Practice in Michigan, supra note 65, at 1566.
Each of the surveys contains a table displaying lawyer income figures by specialty,
and each such table provides by specialty the number of lawyers who reported income. The areas said in the text accompanying this footnote to be "trailing behind"
are not presented in any special order.
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data (and obviously cannot gather data) about every conceivable field
of specialized legal knowledge that could be said to exist. Data regarding median fees charged over many decades by specialists who
primarily or exclusively serve individual clients are available from a
number of states. They indicate that the median fees charged for
work done by such specialists are almost always lower than or equal to
the median fee reported for lawyers as a group. This is true for fees
charged by specialists working in what this Article describes as the
four "core areas of public need"-family law, estate law, torts work
done on behalf of plaintiffs, and real property law-as well as the fees
charged by specialists working in other areas of individual need. The
standard fee charged in a core area of public need is sometimes as
much as one-fifth less than the standard fee reported by lawyers as a
group. Insufficient data exists from which to draw firm conclusions
about the speed with which fees charged by particular types of specialists are changing over time, and that issue will not be addressed further, however.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 display median fee amounts charged by lawyers in
Ohio, Texas, and Iowa by primary field of practice or specialty in the
years 2007, 2003, and 2001. The data are illustrative of the point being
made. Other recent and older economic surveys that contain similar
relevant data could have been used to demonstrate the same point
equally well, and providing more than three tables seems unnecessary.
In each table, the rows of information are arrayed in order by median
fee charged. The tables speak for themselves, and extensive comments on their contents are not necessary. One can see by only
quickly glancing at the tables that work done solving the problems of
individuals tends to be done for a relatively low price.' Even real
property specialists, who frequently work for businesses, report fees
that are lower than or equal to those charged generally. Of course it is
understandable that the standard fees charged for work done by lawyers who specialize in serving the needs of individual clients are low.
Individuals cannot afford to pay the sums that organizations, particularly large-scale organizations, typically can.

95. Many lawyers are certainly taking into account in setting fees that low- and
moderate-income clients have a more limited ability to pay than high-income clients.
Lawyers have sometimes been asked on economic survey questionnaires to state what
factors they consider to be important in setting fees. In a Michigan survey done in
1988, 27% of lawyer respondents stated that a "client's ability to pay" is a "very important" factor in fee determination, and 59% stated it is a "moderately important"
factor. See MICH. 1988 DESKTOP REFERENCE, supra note 65, at 22. In response to a
1986 Alabama survey question, 16% of the state's lawyers stated that "the client's
ability to pay" is a "very important" factor, and 61 % stated it is an "important" factor,
in determining fees. See SURVEY OF LAWYERS IN ALABAMA, supra note 77, at 24.
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4:

OHIO 2007 NOMINAL MEDIAN HOURLY BILLING RATES BY LAWYER'S PRIMARY
96
FIELD OF PRACTICE

Field of Practice

Median
Fee
$125

Field of Practice

Median
Fee

Labor Law (Management)

$188

Criminal (Prosecution)

138

Elder Law/Public Benefits/ERISA

195

Civil Rights

150

Other Specialties

195

Collections

150

Professional Liability

195

Criminal (Public Defendant)

150

Trial Practice, not Pl (General Civil)

195

Personal Injury (Defendant)

150

Administrative Law

198

Probate, Protected Persons

150

Employment Law (Management)

200

Real Property Law

150

Education/School Law

205

Immigration Law

163

Corporate/Business Law

210

Product Liability

165

Intellectual Property

225

Worker's Comp. (Plaintiff)

170

Estate Planning/Wealth Management

225

Bankruptcy, Debtor

175

Employment Law (Labor)

228

Criminal (Private Defendant)

175

Trial Practice, not Pl (Commercial)

228

Domestic Relations/Family Law

175

Taxation

235

General Practice

175

Health & Hospital Law

250

Municipal/Public Entity Law

175

Construction Law

255

Probate, Decedent's Estates

180

Bankruptcy, Creditor

275

Personal Injury (Plaintiff)

185

Environmental Law/ Natural
Resources Law

280

Worker's Comp. (Defense)

185
Median Fee (based on all cases
handled by all Ohio specialists and

$185

Labor Law (Labor)

[list continues at top of next column]

non-specialists)

96.

THE ECONOMICS OF LAw PRACTICE IN

OHIo,

DESKTOP REFERENCE FOR

2007,

supra note 69, at 21.
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5:

TEXAS 2003 NOMINAL MEDIAN HOURLY BILLING RATES BY LAWYER'S
97
SPECIALTY AREA OF PRACTICE
Median
Fee

Field of Practice

Field of Practice

Median
Fee

Bankruptcy Consumer

$125

Real Estate

$200

Bankruptcy Business

142

Oil and Gas

206

Criminal

150

Litigation - General Civil

213

Disability and Workers Compensation

150

Business

225

Insurance

150

Health

225

Litigation - Personal Injury Defense

150

Labor - Employment

230

Environmental and Natural Resources

175

Public Utility

234

Immigration and Naturalization

175

Bankruptcy - Not Specified

240

Litigation - Personal Injury Not
Specified

175

Consumer - DPTA*

241

Family

180

Banking

256

Wills-Trusts-Probate

180

Tax

290

Maritime Admiralty

193

Appellate

300

Administrative and Governmental

200

Alternative Dispute Resolution

325

Construction

200

Intellectual Property

335

Litigation - Not Specified

200

[list continues at top of next column]

International

490

Median Fee (based on all cases
handled by all Texas specialists and

$200

non-specialists)

* "DPTA" is an acronym for the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

97.

HOURLY RATES IN

2003

REPORT,
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6:

IOWA 2001 NOMINAL MEDIAN HOURLY BILLING RATES BY LAWYER'S PRIMARY
98
FIELD OF PRACTICEISOURCE OF INCOME

Field of Practice

Median
Fee

Field of Practice

Median
Fee

Criminal Prosecution

$100

Real Estate Law

$125

Criminal Defense

110

Other

128

Labor Relations (Employees/Unions)

110

Bankruptcy/Receivership

130

Taxation (Individuals/Small
Businesses)

110

Insurance Law (Not Torts)

130

Municipal/Public Entity Law

115

Labor Relations (Management)

135

Estate Planning, Probate and Trusts

120

Professional Malpractice (Defense)

140

Family Law/Domestic Relations

120

Civil Rights

150

General Personal Matters (Not
[Otherwise] Covered)
Banking

123

Professional Malpractice (Plaintiff)

150

125

160

Personal Injury (Defense)

125

General Corporate Law (Not
[Otherwise] Covered)
Intellectual Property

Personal Injury (Plaintiff)

125
Median Fee (based on all cases
handled by all Iowa specialists and
non-specialists)

$125

[list continues at top of next column]

VI. SIZE

180

AND GROWTH OF THE STANDARD HouRLY
PARALEGAL

FEE

Longitudinal data exists on the median fees charged clients
throughout the country for work done by paralegals and legal assistants during the last two decades (see TABLE 7). The National Association of Legal Assistants has been surveying the national paralegal
population concerning their economic and work-related circumstances
at least since 1988, and the association has gathered information about
billed fees at least since 1991."1
Looking at Table 7 we can see that between 1991 and 2010, the
nominal paralegal billing rate in the United States increased 104%,
rising from $48 in 1991 to $98 in 2010. By comparison, the real United
States median hourly billing rate increased only 29%, going from $73
to $94.'" The average compounded real rate of increase across the
nineteen-year period was 1.4%. The real billing rate has not increased
98. THE EcONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN IOWA IN 2001, supra note 74, at 25.
99. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANTS, http://nala.org/survey.aspx
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (describing itself as "the leading professional association
for legal assistants and paralegals providing continuing education and professional
development programs").
100. Please recall that all real dollar figures in this Article are stated in 2007 inflation-adjusted dollars.
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radically over time. Here too, it appears that alleged lawyer avarice
has not motivated harsh increases in the amount charged for law-related expertise.
Further, it should be noted that lawyers who employ paraprofessionals freely hire their own competition. Paralegals are hired to do
work too complex for the average secretary. They are expected to
spend at least the bulk of their time doing work that would otherwise
be done by a lawyer, and lawyers have hired a legion of paralegal
professionals over the past thirty to forty years. It is estimated that
prior to 1972, fewer than 30,000 paralegals worked in the United
States.'o' The Department of Labor reports that there were 128,000
legal assistants employed in the American work force by 1983, however, which represented more than four-and-a-quarter times as many
as in the early 1970s.10 2 By 2006, 345,000 legal assistants worked in
the United States, more than two-and-a-half times as many as the
large number that were already employed in 1983.1s Today the population of legal paraprofessionals is more than a quarter of the size of
the active lawyer population.' 0 4 The fact that lawyers have embraced
the opportunity to hire paralegals is evidence that lawyers have not
aggressively and greedily sought to maintain a monopoly on the right
to provide legal services. Undoubtedly, competitive pressure has
driven lawyers to hire paralegals. As lawyers have hired paralegals,
more lawyers still have felt the need to hire them in order to contain
fees. Thus, while the employment of paralegals has not been an act of
altruism directed toward the client pool, it has unquestionably helped
to constrain the rise in the cost of legal work.

101. Sander & Williams, supra note 30, at 442.
102. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000,
at 417 tbl.669 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/secl3.
pdf.
103. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008,
at 388 tbl.598 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/labor.pdf.
104. AM. BAR ASS'N, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE (2011) [hereinafter LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearchPublicDocuments/201 InationalIawyer-bystate.authcheckdam.pdf (showing that in 2011, 1,225,452 lawyers were "resident and
active" in the United States).
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7:

NOMINAL AND REAL MEDIAN BILLING RATES IN THE UNITED
STATES FOR PARALEGALS AND LEGAL ASSISTANTS, 1991-20101o5

Year

Nominal Median Fee

Real Median Fee
(in 2007 Dollars)

1991
1993
1995

$48 ($46-$50)
$53 ($51-$55)
$58 ($56-$60)

$73 ($70-$76)
$76 ($73-$79)
$79 ($76-$82)

1997

$63 ($61-$65)

$81 ($79-$84)

2000
2002
2004
2008
2010

$68 ($66-$70)
$73 ($71-$75)
$83 ($81-$85)
NA*
$98 ($96-$100)

$82 ($79-$84)
$84 ($82-$86)
$91 ($89-$93)
NA'
$94 ($92-$96)

29%
104%
Increase
1.4%
3.8%
Compounded Average
Annual Increase
* Only average, and not median, fee data is availablefor the year 2008.

The surveys that were consulted for this Article contain more than
just data concerning fee size that are relevant to the charge that lawyers are greedy. Subsequent sections of this Article discuss some of
the other relevant information that the surveys provide.
VII.

FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES FREQUENTLY ARE
NOT CHARGED BY LAWYERS

Legal services consumers report that they frequently are not
charged by lawyers for work done on their behalf. This has been
noted in at least three comprehensive studies of the legal needs of the
public conducted over several decades. Sometimes lawyers do not
charge because a "case" has consisted exclusively of a free initial consultation, but more often they do not charge for other reasons.
Close to one-quarter (or 23%) of the respondents who had previously used a lawyer reported to researchers working on the Curran
105. 2010 National Utilization and Compensation Survey, NALA, http://nala.org/
survey.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2012); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL
ASSISTANTS, 1995 NATIONAL UTILIZATION AND COMPENSATION SURVEY REPORT 30
(1995); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANTS, 2008 NATIONAL
UTILIZATION AND COMPENSATION SURVEY REPORT, SECTION 3, at 2 (2008);
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANTS, 2010 NATIONAL UTILIZATION AND
COMPENSATION SURVEY REPORT, SECTION 3, at 2-3.
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Study" 6 that they had not been personally charged for their most recent completed case. 0 7 Please recall that the Curran Study was done
in the early 1970s. The reasons that clients were not charged varied
and appear in Table 8 below. Table 8 is a modified version of a similar
table contained in the Curran study.
TABLE

8:

DISTRIBUTION OF USERS WHO PAID NO FEES FOR MOST RECENT CASE
08
BY REASON
Free legal service program (Legal Aid, public defender, military legal assistance)

16%

Some other party paying fee (codefendant, coplaintiff, adversary, insurance
company, union, relative, other)

17%

Lawyer did not charge
Lawyer was friend or relative

33%

Lawyer received fees from respondent on other matters and this was just a
simple matter

3%

Lawyer just gave advice

9%

Lawyer just a "nice guy"

6%

Lawyer provided no service

5%

Lawyer did not charge for other reason

11%

TOTAL

100%

It appears that in about 50% of the no-fee cases, fees could legitimately have been charged but were not. The percentage figures associated with "lawyer was a friend or relative," "lawyer received fees
from respondent on other matters," "lawyer just gave advice," and
"lawyer [was] just a nice guy," when added, total roughly 50%.109
Consequently, one can conclude that lawyers did not charge fees even
though legal work was done in roughly 13% (i.e., 23% * 50%) of all
cases handled." 0 There is no way to know how much work lawyers
performed completing no-fee cases, although Curran notes that only
30% of the no-fee cases studied involved more than "limited [lawyer]
service.""
106. CURRAN, supra note 48, at 207.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 207, 222.
109. The figure "11%" in Table 8 associated with the statement "lawyer did not
charge for other reason" is not added into the specific total of 51%. It is possible that
some or all of the lawyers who did not charge for "other reasons" had no right to
collect fees. For example, some lawyers might have lost contingent fee cases and thus
the right to collect fees. Others might have waived fees in conjunction with the settlement of malpractice claims filed against them by clients.
110. 51% of 23% equals 11.7%.
111. CURRAN, supra note 48, at 207.
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The Curran Study is not the only one showing that legal fees frequently are not charged by lawyers to clients, however. The American Bar Association commissioned the Institute of Survey Research at
Temple University to conduct a study of the legal needs of low- and
moderate-income Americans in 1993.112 Over the course of several
months, Temple researchers interviewed spokespersons for 2,784
households." 3 For the purposes of the study, a low-income household
was defined as one with an annual income at or below 125% of the
maximum earned by households living at the official (federal) "poverty level."' A moderate-income household was defined as one with
an annual income above that of a low-income household "but below
$60,000 (that is, below the top quintile of the United States income
distribution)."115 Because moderate-income households included
households in the third and fourth income quintiles, many were actually fairly wealthy. Researchers determined that 55% of the cases in
which low-income respondents had been involved during at least some
part of the previous year had been handled by lawyers free of charge
or were expected by low-income respondents to be handled free of
charge."' 38% of the cases in which moderate-income respondents
had been involved had been handled without charge or were expected
to be handled without charge.'" 7 The reasons that fees had not been
charged or were not expected to be charged are set forward in Table 9
below. Again, Table 9 is simply a recreation of a table appearing in
the original study report.

112.

AM. BAR Ass'N, FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY

(1994), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.authcheckdam.pdf.
113. Id. at pts. 1, 4.
114. Id. at pts. 1, 3.
115. Id.
116. Id. at pts. 1, 29.
117. Id.
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9:
LowIncome
Households

ModerateIncome
Households

55%

38%

20
13

11
1

Pro bono work

3

6

Lawyer worked as favor
Contingency fee & lost
Other
Don't know reason

1
5
6
6

5
3
6
3

43%

59%

30
8
6

45
8
6

Fee Structure
Not (or don't expect to be) charged because:
Free initial consultation
Eligible for Legal Aid

Charged (or expect to be charged):
Usual fee
Reduced fee
Don't know if usual or reduced

A significant number of respondents (20% of those in low-income
households and 11% of those in moderate-income households) had
not been charged because they had participated in free initial consultations. A free initial consultation is the legal services equivalent of a
loss leader. It involves the free delivery of services nonetheless and is
an undeniable bargain for consumers. From the numbers, it is clear
that Americans frequently go to lawyers because lawyers offer free
initial consultations, and it is clear that free consultations often do not
result in paid work for lawyers. For example, 4% of low-income respondents and 11% of moderate-income respondents had received, or
expected to receive, free services "as a favor" or in the form of pro
bono work. A substantial number had received free services because
a contingent fee case had been lost. Even quite a few respondents
who had been charged, or expected to be charged, reported that their
lawyers had charged, or were going to charge, a reduced fee.
Finally, at least one legal needs survey done on a statewide basis, in
New Jersey in 2002, confirms that lawyers frequently do not charge
fees.118 This particular survey concentrated exclusively on the needs
of the poor. Researchers surveyed 1,013 adults drawn randomly from
low-income households.'11 All eligible respondents had gross incomes
below 200% of federally established poverty-level-income.1 20 The
survey report states that
118. See MELVILLE D. MILLER & ANJALI SRIVASTAVA, LEGAL PROBLEMS, LEGAL
NEEDS: THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GAP FACING LOWER INCOME PEOPLE IN NEW
(2002), available at http://LSNJ.org/PDFs/LegalNeedsReport.pdf.
119. Id. at 62.
120. Id. at 61.

JERSEY
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when lower income adults receive legal assistance from organizations or firms other than legal services or legal aid, they will be pro-

vided free legal representation or services 39% of the time.1 2 1
The studies obviously are hard to compare. The Curran and Temple
studies categorize the reasons that fees are sometimes not charged in
somewhat different ways. The New Jersey study does not make a serious attempt to categorize those reasons at all. Each of the studies
examined a somewhat different population, and of course each was
done in a different year. Nonetheless, together they paint a convincing picture: they show that individual consumers are provided free services frequently by members of the private bar and for many different
reasons. They receive free services because their contingent fee cases
are lost; pro bono services are provided; they are lawyers' friends and
relatives; they pay for services on other matters and, in return, small
unrelated matters are handled for free; and for reasons clients do not
understand, because free initial consultations are provided to clients
who then do not hire the lawyers consulted. Often they pay reduced
fees. Consumers are not expected to pay for every minute of every
lawyer's time. Very far from it, and this fact appears not to have
changed over the past thirty to forty years.

VIII. THE PRO BONO
A.

AND

CIVIC

WORK DONE BY LAWYERS

The Nature and Amount of Work Done

While available studies do not explain exactly how much free legal
work is done for individual clients by members of the private bar in
toto, very precise figures are available concerning how much pro bono
work is done.
Pro bono is a Latin expression often translated to mean "for the
public good."12 2 Black's Law Dictionary states that involvement in
pro bono work is involvement in "uncompensated legal services performed especially for the public good.""' Rule 6.1 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct' 2 4 asserts that every lawyer has a "responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay," and that
a lawyer should aspire to "render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico
legal services per year." It goes on to say that more than half of the
time that a lawyer spends doing pro bono work should be spent providing services to "persons of limited means" or to community organizations "in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs
of persons of limited means." According to the Rule, additional pro
bono service should be provided through the following:
121. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
122. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1240 (8th ed. 2004) (stating that the term is taken
from the Latin phrase "pro bono publico").
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 6.1 (2009).
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(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee
to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational
organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational
purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or
would be otherwise inappropriate;
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system
or the legal profession.
Thus, the ABA accepts the view that many sorts of public service
activities can properly be described as pro bono work. Representation of low-income clients is only one of a number of ways to discharge one's pro bono obligation, and delivery of free legal services to
civic or community groups often constitutes pro bono work. In 2005,
the ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service (hereinafter referred to as the "Standing Committee") reported that fortythree states had adopted ethics rules modeled on the most recent or
an earlier version of Model Rule 6.1.125 At that time, a number of
state and local bar associations additionally had adopted resolutions
or policies encouraging pro bono work, and a few local bar associations had conditioned membership on some amount of pro bono
work.126 Today, all states and the District of Columbia have pro bono
policies in force. 1 2 7 Twenty-three states have adopted a goal of fifty
hours per year of work; five have goals of twenty to thirty hours; Oregon has an eighty-hour goal; and most other states do not suggest any
specific number of hours. 128 Virginia's policy recommends that a lawyer spend 2% of his or her professional time doing pro bono work.12 9

125. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., AM. BAR Ass'N,
SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONo WORK OF AMERICA'S LAWYERS
6 (2005) [hereinafter SUPPORTING JUSTICE], available at http://www.americanbar.org/

content/dam/aba/migrated/20 1_build/probono-public Service/report 2011.authcheck
dam.pdf. MRPC 6.1 was first adopted in 1983. Id. The original version stated that
"[a] lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this
responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons
of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations, by service
in activities to improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means."
Id. at 6, 22 n.1.
126. Id. at 6.
127. State-By-State Pro Bono Service Rules, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.american
bar.org/groups/probono-publicservice/policy/state-ethicsrules.html
(last updated
Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter State-By-State Pro Bono Rules].

128. Id.
129. Id.
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Seven states have mandatory, and eleven states have voluntary, reporting of pro bono hours. 30
How have lawyers responded to the organized bar's call for the rendering of pro bono work? 1 3' A national survey of 1,100 lawyers done
over a one-year period in 2003 and 2004 by the Standing Committee
determined that 93% of lawyers "personally believe that pro bono
work is something that lawyers should be doing.""3 2 Only 16% said
they had done no work during the past year meeting any part of the
ABA's definition. 3 3 Only 14% stated they had done no work that
"met either the ABA's or their own definition of pro bono."1 3 4 A
chart in the formal report of survey results (recreated in a modified
form as Table 10 below) identifies the percentage of respondents who
engaged in each of the various pro bono activities sanctioned by the
American Bar Association.
TABLE 10:
PERCENT OF ATTORNEYS PROVIDING FREE LEGAL SERVICES BY
PRO BONO ACTIVITY (BASE=1,100)1 3 5

Entity

Percent of Attorneys
Providing Free Service

People of Limited Means

60%

Organizations for Poor

33

Improving Legal System

46

Organizations for Civil Rights

15

Other Non-Profit Organizations

46

In the Standing Committee survey, lawyers who had done at least
some pro bono work' 3 6 were asked to estimate how many hours they
had worked on each sanctioned activity. Respondents provided the
following information:
130. Overview of State Pro Bono Reporting Policies, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://apps.

americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/reporting.html (last updated July 14, 2009).
131. A very well organized effort is ongoing not only to encourage pro bono work
but also to enable it. Today more than 900 formal programs operate in the United
States with the purpose of referring potential low-income pro bono clients to practicing lawyers or to law students authorized to practice under practice statutes or other
relevant law. See SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 6.
132. Id. at 20.
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Here, "pro bono work" means work that met any of the ABA definitions of
"pro bono work" that appeared when the survey was conducted in the then-current
version of MRPC 6.1. Id. at 9-10, 13.
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TABLE 11:
ESTIMATE OF THE AVERAGE HOURS OF FREE SERVICES
PROVIDED (BASE=1,100)1 3 7
Entity
People of Limited Means
Organizations for Poor
Improving Legal System
Organizations for Civil Rights
Other Non-Profit Organizations
TOTAL

Hours of Free Service
27
12
17
6
15
77

As Table 11 above shows and as the survey report noted, the average respondent provided thirty-nine hours of free services just by engaging in the first two activities in the table-that is, by rendering
service to people of limited means and organizations serving the poor.
These are both priority activities under the current version of Model
Rule 6.1, and, following the practice of the Standing Committee, this
Article subsequently refers to these activities as "Tier 1" activities.
The average respondent additionally worked for thirty-eight hours,
engaged in other sanctioned ("Tier 2") activities, and did a total of
seventy-seven hours of free pro bono work. If one takes into account
the average number of lawyer pro bono hours done by the group of
respondents who acknowledged doing no ABA-approved work (i.e.,
their zero hours of work), the average lawyer rendered sixty-five, not
seventy-seven, hours of service, however.13 8
There is no reason to believe that private practitioners do less pro
bono work on average than lawyers working in other practice settings.
The Standing Committee determined that private practitioners are
much more likely than corporate counsel or government lawyers to
engage in Tier 1 legal work.13 9 It stands to reason that practitioners
likewise do much more Tier 1 work than academicians, who often
carry no professional liability insurance and frequently do not represent either paying or pro bono clients. Economic survey data gathered recently in Oregon indicate that private practitioners, lawyers
who work for non-profit organizations, and government lawyers do
137. Id. at 12.
138. While some lawyers do much less pro bono work than is average for the profession, some do much more. 5% of Colorado lawyers performed 200 or more hours
of pro bono work in the year 2000. See COLo. 2000 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note
73, at 32. 5% of Ohio lawyers performed 188 or more hours of pro bono service in
2007. See THE

ECONOMICS OF LAw PRACTICE IN OHIo, DESKTOP REFERENCE FOR

2007, supra note 69, at 27.
139. 33% of government lawyers, 35% of corporate counsel, and 73% of private
practitioners performed Tier 1 activities during the twelve months preceding the survey.

SUPPORTING JUSTICE,

supra note 125, at 12.
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very similar total amounts of pro bono and community service work,
and the data further indicate that each of these groups does more pro
bono and community service work than either in-house corporate
counsel or judges and hearing officers.14 0
B.

Monetizing the Value of Work Done

Should the amount of pro bono work done by private practitioners
each year be considered a little or a lot? Bar association economic
survey data, as discussed above in this Article, indicate that in most
states, the standard hourly feel'4 charged currently by members of the
private bar ranges between $150 and $200. The average practitioner
would charge paying clients between $9,750 and $13,000 then for
sixty-five hours of legal work, and it seems safe to assume that the
average practitioner does at least an average of sixty-five hours of pro
bono work per year. On the surface, it seems that by doing pro bono
work, the average practitioner makes a substantial contribution to his
or her community.
One might object to the way in which the Author has monetized the
value of pro bono work. After all, the typical pro bono client cannot
pay for legal services. Why should any monetary value at all be attributed to such services? Monetary value should be attributed because
the work has an opportunity cost, even if it is work that by definition
is never paid work. A private practitioner who does volunteer work is
reducing the energy and limiting the time that he or she has to perform work done for a fee. If instead of doing sixty-five hours of volunteer work, a practitioner worked an additional sixty-five billable
hours, that attorney could earn an additional $9,750 to $13,000. Foregoing that amount of income is unquestionably laudable.
Additionally, one might object to the fact that the Author has monetized the value of pro bono work done for community organizations
and to improve the legal system. The ABA definition of pro bono
work includes both types of work. Non-lawyers as well as attorneys
do work designed to improve the law, the legal system, and the legal
profession, and such work clearly often has very limited market value.
Clerical work, collecting signatures on a referendum petition, and
telephoning voters are forms of volunteer work with limited value, for
example. Further, work done by a volunteer for a community organization or to advance a favored cause is often done in the evening, and
it can be argued that work done in the evening has little or no opportunity cost for most workers-at least in the form of lost income.
Most paid work is done during the day.
140. OREGON STATE BAR 2002 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 71, at 37.
141. Both the average hourly fee and the median hourly fee in most states range
between $150 and $200. See supra Part V.B.
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However, even if one restricts one's focus to the amount of pro
bono service work being done solely for low-income clients, the great
bulk of which is undoubtedly ordinary case work done during the day
(and is therefore work with an undeniable opportunity cost), the contribution of lawyers, and in particular private practitioners, to the public good is impressive. As noted in Table 10, 60% of all lawyers report
doing work for "people of limited means." Those who do such work
report doing an average of twenty-seven hours of work per year.
Again, if one takes into account lawyers who do no such work, then
the average lawyer in the United States performs 16.2 hours of free pro
bono work per year for individuals with modest or low incomes and
consequently, donates services to people in that group annually that
are worth roughly between $2,400 and $3,200. Over one million lawyers are licensed in the United States currently. 142 An average donation of between $2,400 and $3,200 per year by lawyers to low-income
Americans represents a total donation of roughly $2 billion (using the
conservative $2400 figure) to more than $3 billion (using the higher
$3,200 figure). That is a substantial and, again, laudable sum. How
much of that sum is being donated by allegedly greedy private practitioners? Today, private practitioners comprise roughly three quarters
of the bar." Since it appears that private practitioners do significantly more pro bono casework than other lawyers, one can conclude
that more than three-quarters of $2-$3 billion, i.e., more than $1.5 to
$2.25 billion, is being donated by private practitioners each year to the
commonwealth in the form of labor.
Finally, it should be said that close to half of all lawyers donate
money to legal services or pro bono programs. The Standing Committee survey asked lawyers whether they had donated any money to
such programs during the "past" year-that is, during the year prior to
the date on which the survey question was being answered. 43% answered that they had donated money, and those who had donated reported an average contribution of $276.14 Twelve states, as well as
the District of Columbia, encourage monetary contributions to public
service organizations in their pro bono policy statements or describe
such contributions as potential alternatives to pro bono work.' 4 5
Many lawyers outside of those thirteen jurisdictions are obviously
contributing money to legal services and pro bono programs as well.

142. LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE, supra note 104, at 3.
143. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN 2000, at 28 (2004) (stating that in the year 2000, 75% of male lawyers,
71.2% of female lawyers, and 74% of all lawyers in the United States in the year 2000
worked in private practice).
144. SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note

125, at 16-17.
145. State-By-State Pro Bono Rules, supra note 127.
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Why do lawyers do pro bono work? Deborah Rhode surveyed 844
individuals and firms about their pro bono work recently.146 She discovered that individual lawyers who do pro bono work1 47 rank "personal satisfaction," and "sense of professional obligation" as their
primary motivations. On a scale of one to five, with five representing
"very significant" and one representing "not significant," her respondents gave these factors ratings of 4.4 and 4.0 respectively.148 The
next most highly ranked motives were "employer encouragement"
(with a rating of 2.5); "reputation/recognition" (2.5); "employer policies" (2.3); "opportunity for trial experience" (2.2); "professional
value of pro bono work (contacts, training, referrals)" (2.1); and "political commitment" (2.0).149 Other motivations examined by Rhode
all received scores of less than 2.0 and thus were perceived as relatively insignificant by respondents. As might be suspected, lawyers
then do pro bono work for mixed motives. They do it principally because helping others is personally satisfying and because they take
their professional obligations seriously. Additionally, they sometimes
do it because they believe it helps them personally, helps their firm, or
helps the profession. Rhode has pointed out, however, that in having
"mixed motives," lawyers are not much different from ordinary
Americans who help others: "As a wide range of data makes clear,
motivations for assisting others usually are mixed, and a degree of
self-interest is typically present."' 50
IX.

FEES THAT ARE DUE TO LAWYERS FREQUENTLY
ARE NOT COLLECTED

A. The Evidence
Lawyers have the skills, and the great majority have the temperament, necessary to collect fees that are overdue. Data from a number
of states suggest that lawyers are typically, and surprisingly, reluctant
to use aggressive methods to collect fees, however.
In Iowa in 2006, when asked on an economic survey questionnaire
what action they "usually" take with "reference to fees charged but
not paid in due course," 28% of lawyers answered that they "take no
action," and 45% stated they "dun [their] client [and] take no further
action." 6% said they "turn [the] account over to a collection
146. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACriCE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS 127 (2005). Survey questionnaires were mailed "begin-

ning in 2001." Id. at 230. Thus, questionnaires could have been sent in one
subsequent years. See id.
147. Id. at 181. In the survey questionnaire, pro bono work was defined
vices undertaken normally without expectation of fees and consisting of the
of legal services to persons of limited means or to charitable, religious, civic,
nity, governmental, and educational organizations." Id.
148. Id. at 131.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 56-57.
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agency." Fewer, only 1%, said they "turn [the delinquent] account
over to another lawyer," and 11% answered that they "sue [a] client if
all other options fail."' 5' Thus the great majority indicated that they
generally take no action on an overdue bill or simply make repeated
demands for payment (i.e., "dun" their nonpaying client) without the
intention of taking further action. Less than one-eighth stated they
turn delinquent accounts over to other lawyers for collection or use
lawsuits even as a last resort. Few said they use collection agencies.
In Nebraska in 2006, on a bar sponsored questionnaire, lawyers
were asked how they "primarily handle past-due billings and fee disputes." About one-half (46%) of lawyers said they "negotiate or voluntarily reduce [their] fee," and more than a third (37%) stated they
"write [unpaid bills] off as a loss." Less than one-fifth (17%) said they
use a collection agency, while only 7% stated they file suit. None used
a fee dispute resolution program.' 5 2
As part of an economic survey done in 1998, the Alabama State Bar
asked lawyers in telephone interviews, "[d]oes your organization take
any of the following actions with reference to charged fees not paid in
due course," and with regard to each potential action that interviewers
then stated, allowed respondents to answer "yes," "no," or "don't
know." Alabama lawyers gave the following responses: 5 3

Negotiation with Clients
Send a Dunning Letter
File a Suit
Turn the Account Over to a Collection
Agency or Another Lawyer
Enter into Fee Mediation

Yes

NoQ

74%
61%
24%
11%

18%
28%
65%
79%

Don't Know or
No Answer
8%
11%
10%
10%

8%

81%

11%

Thus, the sparse datal 5 4 that are available indicate that lawyers try
to avoid using lawsuits or commercial collection agencies to collect
151. IOWA ECONOMIC SURVEY 2006, supra note 74, at 10 (emphasis added). Also,
10% of survey participants did not answer. Id.
152. NEB. STATE BAR Ass'N, 2006 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 68, at 18. An
additional 7% stated they collect fees primarily using "other" methods. Id. The percentage figures add to more than 100%; some respondents apparently chose more
than one of the answers listed on the survey questionnaire. See id.
153. SURVEY OF LAWYERS IN ALABAMA, supra note 77, at 28. The same question
was asked during a survey done in 1986, and very similar responses were given by
Alabama lawyers. Fisher, supra note 77, at 160.
154. See 2003 ECONOMIC SURVEY REPORT, supra note 66, at 31, app. 3. In 2003,
the Missouri Bar asked lawyers whether they had been involved in a fee dispute during the previous year. Id. The Bar additionally asked each lawyer how he or she
"primarily handle[d]" disputes. Id. 29% of Missouri lawyers answered that they "negotiate or voluntarily reduce [the] fee," 2% said that they utilize the state's "Fee Dispute Resolution Committee," 1% stated that they file a "lawsuit," 2.4% said they use
"other means," ("other" was listed on the questionnaire as one potential answer), and
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overdue fees. Lawyers instead tend to negotiate with nonpaying clients, dun clients, reduce fee amounts charged, and write off uncollectible fees as bad debts.
Economic survey data gathered in four states (Colorado, Michigan,
Nebraska, and Ohio) suggest that lawyers currently do not usually
even add interest or "service" charges to sums that are overdue. By
failing to add charges of this sort to overdue accounts, lawyers are
failing to subject clients even to the modest pressure-to-pay that interest and service charges would create. In answer to survey questions,
72% of Ohio lawyers and 55% of Colorado lawyers stated in 2007 and
2000 respectively that they never add a service charge to their bills.
Only 10% of Ohio lawyers said they always or often add a service
charge, and less than a quarter of Colorado lawyers (22%) stated that
they always or usually add a charge.15 5 In Nebraska in 2006, 73% of
lawyers stated they do not charge interest on past-due billings, while
27% stated that they do. 15 6 In Michigan in 2000, only 9% of lawyers
said they always add a service charge to a delinquent account, while
15% said they usually do. The remainder (76%) said only that they
sometimes add a charge.' 5 7
Understandably, lawyers also often report that they have difficulty
collecting fees. Bar associations in surveys often ask lawyers to report
the percentage of billed fees that the lawyers' firm or the lawyers fail
to collect. Sometimes the question is posed as the percentage of billed
fees that has to be considered a complete loss. In whatever form the
question is posed, lawyers across the United States are remarkably
consistent in the answers that they give. A high percentage of billed
fees are commonly deemed to be uncollectible. Tables 12 and 13 display data recently gathered in eight states concerning uncollectible
fees.' Notice that in every state, a significant fraction of lawyers say
65% provided no answer. Id. The Missouri Bar also asked lawyers how they "primarily" handled "past-due billings that are not being disputed by the client." Id. 47.7%
said that they "write off [the amounts due] as a loss." Id. 6% said they use a "collection agency," while 7% stated they file a "lawsuit." Id. 23% said they use one or
more "other" methods of collecting fees, and 16% provided no answer. Id.
155. THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN OHIO, DESKTOP REFERENCE FOR 2007,
supra note 69, at 30; COLO. 2000 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 73, at 31.
156. NEB. STATE BAR ASS'N, 2006 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 68, at 18.
157. The 2000 Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law Practice in Michigan,
supra note 65, at 1561. The report states additionally that 53% of lawyers who add a

charge add less than 1% to their legal bills, 33% add I to 2%, and 14% add over 2%.
Id.

158. See MONT. 2005 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 76, at 5, 6 (In answer to the
question, "[firom these hours billed [i.e., the hours that you bill], what amount is
actually paid," 67.5% of respondents stated "76-100%," 17.5% stated "67-75%,"
8.3% said "51-66%," and 6.7% said "50% or less."); see also Fisher, supra note 77, at
160 (In response to the question, "[albout what percentage of your organization's
charged fees during the last fiscal year were not collected," lawyers provided the following answers: "none" (6%), "1-5 percent" (39%), "6-10 percent" (27%), "11-20
percent" (16%), and "more than 20 percent" (12%).).
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that roughly 1/10th or more of billed fees are uncollectible. For example, in Iowa 26% of lawyers state that 10% or more of fees are uncollectible. In Colorado, 37% of lawyers report that 9% or more of fees
cannot be collected. In Kansas, 48% of lawyers report that 9% of fees
or more are uncollectible. One might wonder why, given the private
bar's poor collection record, lawyers are not more forceful in their
collection efforts.
TABLE

12:

PERCENTAGE OF BILLED LEGAL FEES REPORTED
UNCOLLECTIBLE BY COLORADO, KANSAS, MICHIGAN, AND
OHIO LAWYERS 1 59
Percent of Billed
Fees That Are
Uncollectible

Percent of Responses
Colorado
(2000)

Kansas
(1997)
25%

Michigan
(2000)
30%

Ohio
(2007)
36%

2% or Less

34%

3-8%

29

27

28

28

9-12%

19

25

21

19

13% or More

18

23

21

17

159. CoLo. 2000 ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 73, at 31; 1997 Economic Survey
of Kansas Lawyers, supra note 78, at E-13; The 2000 Desktop Reference on the
Economics of Law Practice in Michigan, supra note 65, at 1561; THE ECONOMICS OF
LAw PRACTICE IN OHIO, DESKTOP REFERENCE FOR 2007, supra note 69, at 30.
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TABLE

13:

PERCENTAGE OF BILLED LEGAL FEES REPORTED
UNCOLLECTIBLE BY IOWA, MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, AND
OKLAHOMA LAWYERS1 60
Percent of Billed
Fees That
Are Uncollectible

Percent of Responses
Iowa

Missouri

Nebraska

Oklahoma

(2006)

(2005)

(2006)

(2002)

3.5%

na

na

na

Less Than 5%

38

44%

45%

32%

5-9%

25

27

25

22

10-19%
20% or More
20-29%
30% or More
No Response

18
8
na
na
7.5

19
na
6
5
na

19
na
7
2
na

22
13
na
na
10

None

B.

The Reasons

No credible research seems to be available explaining the reasons
why lawyers do not use forceful tactics to collect fees. Lawyers undoubtedly believe or know that many clients cannot, as a practical
matter, be compelled to pay. Lawyers often know a great deal about
their clients' finances. Additionally, it takes time to collect overdue
bills-time that can often be better spent generating more billable
hours.
Further, lawsuits against clients, although permitted under all jurisdictions' ethical rules, can damage the reputation of a lawyer. As one
commentator who has written about the efficacy of asserting attorneys' liens during fee disputes has asked facetiously, "who wants to be
known as the lawyer who sues his clients?"161 He might as well have
asked, "Who wants to be known as the lawyer who hires other lawyers
to sue his clients?" Further, lawsuits can lead to disciplinary complaints and malpractice counterclaims asserting either negligence or
misconduct. A significant percentage of client complaints to bar officials consist of complaints about fees,162 and studies done by insurers
have determined that 25% to 45% of malpractice actions are counter160. IOWA ECONOMIC SURVEY 2006, supra note 74, at 10; 2005 MIssouRI BAR
ECONOMIC SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 66, at 41; NEB. STATE BAR Ass'N, 2006
ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 68, at 18; Payton, supra note 70, at 3427.
161. Zach Eisner, Rethinking Attorney Liens: Why Washington Attorneys Are
Forced Into "Involuntary" Pro Bono, 27 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 827, 828 (2004).
162. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 557 (1986) ("A typical report of bar committees and researchers is that fee disputes are frequent, and a high
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claims to lawyer fee actions. 16 3 Insurance companies sometimes
screen lawyers before insuring them in part on the basis of previously
filed claims for fees.16 4 A suit, if met with a counterclaim for malpractice or the mere assertion of malpractice by a client, can lead to the
need to report the claim or assertion to an insurer. Lawyers whose
work predominantly serves the needs of individuals may have the
most concern about malpractice suits. A recent ABA survey shows
that malpractice claims as a general matter are most frequently filed
against lawyers practicing in the areas of plaintiffs' personal injury
work; real estate law; defendants' personal injury work; family law;
and estates, trusts, and probate. 20%, 16%, 10%, 10%, and 9% of all
claims filed are filed respectively against lawyers in these fields. 6 s Finally and obviously, recoveries by clients as a result of malpractice
counterclaims can be much greater than the fees claimed by lawyers in
the suits that provoked the counterclaims. In illustrating the same
point, Anthony Davis has recently cited a case in which one firm's
action to collect fees resulted in a $7 million verdict against that firm
for malpractice, including a $5 million award for punitive damages.16 6
Bad things can happen as a result of harsh measures undertaken to
collect fees.
It should also be noted that the organized bar actively discourages
lawsuits by lawyers against clients to collect fees and has done so literally for 100 years. This may be because of client protection concerns;
lawyers are considerably more capable of handling the practical business of fee disputes than are most clients. They are more capable of
handling mediation, arbitration, bar investigations, and lawsuits. Additionally, lawyers control access to most of the records that can prove
or disprove the legitimacy of their claims for fees. There is an inherent power imbalance in a fee dispute. But it is more likely that the
organized bar is concerned about the professional reputation of lawyers as a whole. 6 Canon 14 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics adopted in 1908 stated the following:
Controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be
avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his selfrespect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his
proportion of client and public complaints about lawyers involve charges of excessive
fee charges.") (footnotes omitted).
163. James M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETics 59, 83 (2006).
164. Id. at 84.
165. AM. BAR Ass'N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYER'S PROF'L LIAB., PROFILE OF
LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2000-2003, at 4 (2005).
166. Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETIcs 95, 99 (2008).
167. Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of A DR,

46 SMU L. REV. 2005, 2020 (1993) ("The avowed 'primary motive' of [early efforts to
provide alternatives to litigation as a means of resolving fee disputes] was a desire to
protect the bar's image.").
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services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud.' 6 8
Similar but more emphatic language later appeared in Ethical Consideration 2-23 of the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility first published in 1969. The Ethical
Consideration stated the following:
A lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversy over
fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any differences on the subject. He should not sue a client for a fee unless
necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client.16 9
Today, authorities with the power to control lawyer behavior, including the organized bar and state legislatures, have moved beyond
merely avowing that lawyers have the obligation to avoid suits for
fees. Jurisdictions have increasingly adopted mandatory, as well as
voluntary, fee dispute resolution programs. 7 o A survey done by the
ABA in 2008 showed that at least forty-five states have such programs' 7 ' Thirty-two of these forty-five states have programs that allow clients to "arbitrate" their claims even if the attorney declines to
participate; nine programs require attorneys to participate if the client
requests participation; and fee arbitration is binding in thirty-two
states.17 2 Arbitration is free or costs and only requires a nominal sum
in at least thirty-two states. 7 3 Information about the programs is generally available on bar association websites, and almost all associations provide assistance by phone to clients who call asking for
information about the programs."17 Binding arbitration programs are
clearly designed to prevent lawyers from suing clients. Given the time
and effort they take, mandatory non-binding arbitration and mediation programs impede the ability of lawyers to sue.
Social research seems unnecessary to understand why lawyers are
typically not particularly forceful in their efforts to collect fees. It is in
their interest, the interest of the organized bar, the interest of clients,
and the interest of malpractice insurance companies that lawyers
avoid aggressive collection methods. Given the caution that lawyers
168. ABA CODE OF PROF'L ETHICS CANON 14 (1908), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/cpr/1908_code.authcheckdam.pdf; see
also ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943) ("Ours is a
learned profession, not a mere money getting trade . . . Suits to collect fees should be

avoided. Only when the circumstances imperatively require, should resort be had to a
suit to compel payment.").
169. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline,

Op. 1991-96 (1991).

170. STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., AM. BAR Ass'N, 2008 ABA FEE ARBITRATION SURVEY 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/

aba/migrated/cpr/clientpro/feearb.authcheckdam.pdf.
171. Id. at 3-8.

172. Id. at 1.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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exercise in collecting fees, the statements they make to bar associations about the amount of fees that they typically fail to collect seem
eminently believable. One has to wonder whether lawyers as a group
will continue to be so disinclined to aggressively collect fees, but to
date they have been surprisingly disinclined.
X. SIZE

AND

GROWTH

OF THE AVERAGE INCOME OF

PRIVATE

PRACTITIONERS

Up to this point, the focus of this Article has been on the fees that
lawyers charge and fee collection. However, members of the public
are concerned about more than just lawyer fees. They are concerned
also about the related issue of lawyer income. As already discussed,
many Americans believe strongly that private practitioners, at least in
general, "greedily" make too much money from the fees that they
charge. Have the real incomes of practitioners increased, decreased,
or stayed about the same during the past several decades as public
demand for legal services has risen? The United States Census Bureau has published figures concerning the average income of lawyers
by gender that one can use to calculate the average yearly income of
all lawyers and judges between the years 1982 and 1992.175 In 1995,
the Census Bureau published the average yearly income of all lawyers
and judges the previous year-that is, in 1994.116 During every subsequent year, the Census Bureau has also published the same income
figure for the preceding year."' Figures are available at the time of
the writing of this Article through the year 2008; consequently, it is
possible to trace the increase in lawyer income over several recent
decades using reliable data.
Figures are also available from state bar sponsored economic
surveys that allow one to calculate ratios on a state level of averageyearly-private-practitioner-income to average-yearly-lawyer-income.
In any given year in any given state, that ratio is likely to be within the
range of roughly 1.05 to 1.20."1 In other words, in any given year,
private practitioners make from 5% to 20% more than lawyers as a
175. See Population - Consumer Income Reports (P60), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/p60.htmi (last visited Sept. 19, 2012). See the
editions covering the years 1982 to 1992.
176. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, MARCH 1995 (1995),
available at http://www.census.gov/apsd/techdoc/cps/cpsmar95.pdf.
177. See Current PopulationSurvey (CPS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/cps/methodology/techdocs.html (last revised Sept. 18, 2012).
178. See, e.g., Henderson & Weinrobe, supra note 65, at 8; Wright, supra note 65, at
1306; The 1988 Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law Practice in Michigan,

supra note 65, at 16-17; The 1991 Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law Practice in Michigan, supra note 65, at 1231, 1233; Economics Survey: The Economics of
Law Practice in Michigan, supra note 65, at 1225, 1227; The 1997 Desktop Reference
on the Economics of Law Practicein Michigan, supra note 65, at 1315, 1317; The 2000
Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law Practicein Michigan, supra note 65, at

1551, 1553.
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group make. Also, in any given state across time, the ratio tends to
fluctuate, sometimes rising and sometimes falling. There is no evidence that private practitioners have recently been earning a larger
and larger fraction of all money earned by lawyers. The fact that the
ratio being discussed is commonly so close to "1.0" should not be
much of a surprise. Private practitioners constitute the great bulk of
all lawyers, and since 1980 private practitioners have constituted an
increasing share of the total lawyer population.'7 9 Currently, they
constitute about three-quarters of all lawyers. It appears that one can
take the rate of change in the yearly income of lawyers and judges in
the United States to be the approximate rate of increase of private
practitioner income.
Table 14 below compares the average yearly total money earnings
of full- and part-time American workers fifteen years old and older
with the earnings of lawyers and judges in the United States during
the years 1982 to 2008. During that twenty-six year period, the average real income of United States workers increased 41%, while the
average income of lawyers and judges increased 76%. Each year during the period, the average income of private practitioners was probably 5%-20% greater than the average shown in the table for lawyers
and judges more generally. It is very likely that during the twenty-six
year period, the income of private practitioners also increased roughly
76%.

179. THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000,
supra note 143, at 6 (stating that in 1980, 1991, and 2000, private practitioners constituted 68%, 73%, and 74% respectively of the total population of lawyers in the
United States).
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TABLE

14:

AVERAGE TOTAL MONEY EARNINGS OF FULL- AND PART-TIME AMERICAN WORKERS
15 YEARS OLD AND OVER AND FULL- AND PART-TIME AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
8 0
JUDGES, 1982-2008. (REAL DOLLAR AMOUNTS ARE IN CONSTANT 2007 DOLLARS.)1
Income Of
Income Of
Lawyers
Income Of Lawyers
And
U.S.
And
Judges In Workers In Judges In
Constant
Real
Real
Dollars
Dollars
Dollars

Income Of
Income Of
Lawyers
Income Of
Lawyers
And
U.S.
And
Judges In Workers In Judges in
Constant
Real
Real
Dollars
Dollars
Dollars

Year

Income Of
U.S.
Workers In
Constant
Dollars

$80,159

1996

$27,366

$97,127

$36,157

86,108

1997

28,754

96,555

37,138

124,709

30,952

78,468

1998

30,135

107,697

38,325

136,967

45,716

31,933

88,075

1999

31,521

99,008

39,222

123,195

52,625

33,134

99,536

2000

33,688

99,251

40,555

119,482

18,382

51,400

33,544

93,796

2001

35,034

112,319

41,008

131,472

1988

19,419

55,297

34,029

96,898

2002

35,557

121,516

40,973

140,024

1989

20,779

63,326

34,739

105,866

2003

36,323

135,260

40,923

152,388

1990

21,197

65,860

33,620

104,459

2004

37,151

133,970

40,770

147,019

1991

21,798

70,114

33,176

106,715

2005

38,828

141,025

41,214

149,690

1992

22,667

80,325

33,491

118,683

2006

40,649

134,795

41,798

138,606

1993

NA

NA

NA

NA

2007

41,328

139,674

41,328

139,674

1994

25,189

76,302

35,234

106,730

2008

41,948

140,896

41,910

140,767

1995

26,099

75,939

35,501

103,295

Percent
Increase
1982 to

202.5%

277.6%

40.7%

75.6%

Year

Income Of
U.S.
Workers In
Constant
Dollars

1982

$13,868

$37,315

$29,790

1983

14,641

41,372

30,473

1984

15,513

39,329

1985

16,575

1986

17,518

1987

$128,326

2008
*

The data covers only civilian workers for years 1987 and earlier.

It seems then that the average income of private practitioners has
been rising faster than the average income of Americans generally,
but it has certainly not risen at a rate that is shocking.
It has already been established that the average practitioner is controlling growth in the size of his or her standard hourly fee as well as
growth in the size of fees charged for paralegal work. Nonetheless,
could the fact that the average incomes of practitioners and American
workers have risen at very different rates be evidence of lawyer
greed? It could conceivably be evidence of greed if it indicates that
lawyers increasingly overbill; one explanation for the divergence in
incomes might be that overbilling is increasingly rampant. When
asked if they think that other lawyers overbill, the vast majority of
private practitioners (80%) say they think that overcharging is only
180. See Population- Consumer Income Reports (P60), supra note 175; CURRENT
SURVEY, MARCH 1995, supra note 176; Current Population Survey
(CPS), supra note 177.
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occasional or is rare, however."8 ' Judges who are called upon to approve bills submitted to clients by lawyers seem to approve all or most
hours.' 82 And it is very difficult to imagine that the significant disparity could be accounted for by fraud which, if detected, could result in
criminal punishment and disbarment.
Further, it would be odd to claim that lawyer fraud has been widespread (widespread across many practitioners), severe (sufficiently severe to account for the disparity at issue), and sustained over all or
most of a twenty-six year period. Such a claim would implicitly accept
the notion that consumers of legal services have over a lengthy period
been willing to pay bills for legal services that incorporate the cost of
fraud. If that has been true, why have lawyers risked committing
fraud? Why have they not simply billed for the hours that they have
worked and charged higher billing rates? The empirical evidence
shows that there has been plenty of room over the years for hourly fee
increases. Real fee increases have been very modest over many
decades.
If overbilling and fee gouging do not explain recent lawyer/American-worker income disparity, then what does? Income inequality in
the United States has been rising over several decades. Various measures of inequality consistently show that this is so. Households in the
highest (i.e., the fifth) income quintile earn an increasing share of all
money earnings."' Ratios showing the relationship between the earnings of high and low male income earners are rising;' 8 4 the ratio of
ninetieth-percentile income to tenth-percentile income is rising, as is
the ratio of median income to tenth-percentile income.18 5 The same
ratios are rising for women. 8 6 Economists do not clearly understand
why.'87 Income inequality is rising in most nations of the world.' 8 It
would be mere pretense for the Author to claim to know with certainty the factors causing the growing gap between lawyers and other
workers.
The factors might include ones that operate on a macroeconomic as
well as a microeconomic scale, such as technological progress and
181. William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 4

RUTGERS

L.

REV. 1, 16 (1991).

182. Id. at 13.
183. U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 40-41 (2006), available at http://www.census.

gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf.
184. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE NATION'S INCOME DisTRIBUTION: 1947 - 1998, at 3 (2000), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-204.pdf.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, A New Deal for Globalization,86
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 34, 41 (2007).
188. INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: GLOBALIZATION AND
INEQUALITY 135, 139 (2007).
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globalization. A 2007 International Monetary Fund report states that
technological progress and the growth of trade between nations account for part of the growing income inequality experienced in advanced economies,189 and it seems quite possible that law firms and
therefore lawyers are benefiting more from recent advances in information processing and communications technology than most other
businesses and their workers. Law is fundamentally an information
processing business, and technological advances have undoubtedly
helped to contain costs significantly. Liberalization of trade policy
and the flow of investment capital across borders has generated increased competition between American and foreign workers-competition from which lawyers are largely insulated. Competition between
American and foreign workers may have disproportionately depressed the growth of the average worker's income. Global competition should affect lawyer income growth at least somewhat because a
large portion of law firm receipts come from individuals as already
noted, and individuals are less likely to purchase services when they
are experiencing stagnant or slow income growth. 90
The growing income gap between lawyers and the worker population generally might be explainable by factors that operate directly
and simply. For example, private practitioners are working more billable hours than they did forty years ago. Surveys done in the late
1960s and in 1970 indicate that practitioners around that time tended
to bill in the range of 1,400 to 1,500 hours per year, 19 ' while studies
done in the mid-1980s and early 1990s show they were then billing in
the range of 1,500 to 1,700 hours annually.'" Today, private practitioners generally bill 1,750 hours per year or more. 93 Thus, there has
189. Id. at 154.
190. See infra Part VIII.A. Consumers as a group cannot easily avoid the purchase
of at least some legal services in any era, however. Criminal defendants and Americans facing divorce or bankruptcy greatly benefit from legal assistance, for example.
191. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 192 (1989). Abel discusses three
studies showing (1) Florida lawyers billed a median of 1,450 hours in 1966, (2) Colorado lawyers billed a median of 28.2 hours per week, or 1,410 hours for a fifty-week
year in 1967, and (3) South Carolina lawyers billed a median of 1,450 hours in 1969.
Id. See also Billie Bethel, Report of the 1967 Economic Survey of the State Bar of

Texas, 31 TEx. B.J. 9, 50 (1968) (reporting that, in Texas, associates; associates working for sole practitioners; sole practitioners; sole practitioners who employ associates;
sole practitioners sharing office space with others; and partners respectively report
medians of 1,500; 1,500; 1,300; 1,500; 1,200; and 1,500 hours per year); see also Billie
Bethel, Report of the 1970 Economic Survey of the Oklahoma Bar Association, 41

B.J. 2853, 2872 (1970) (reporting that in Oklahoma, the "median lawyer" reports 6 chargeable hours of work per day; this would be equal to 1,500 hours per year
for a 250-day working year).
192. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 65, at 1306 (showing a median of thirty chargeable
hours reported per week); Monnot, supra note 70, at 3563 (showing an average of
thirty-two chargeable hours reported per week).
193. Molvig, supra note 80, at 8, no.2 (reporting that Wisconsin lawyers in 2005
billed an average of thirty-five hours per week, or roughly 1,750 hours per year asOKLA.

suming a fifty-week year); 1997 Economic Survey of Kansas Lawyers, supra note 78,
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been a gradual but significant rise over many decades in the average
practitioner's annual billable hours total. It is logical to presume that
the increase has been enabled by growth in the size of law firms. Private practitioners work in increasingly large practice settings. Because staff members in large organizations can serve very specialized
functions, lawyers can leave many if not most clerical, technical, and
routine administrative matters to legal secretaries, computer and technology experts, librarians, marketing specialists, and messengers. This
allows lawyers to concentrate on casework. Since 1960, the number of
lawyers working in firms has increased at two times the rate that the
number of lawyers working alone as solo practitioners has." 4 In 1960,
64% of private practitioners were solo practitioners. By the year 2000,
fewer than half (48%) were. 95 Marc Galanter has noted that only
several thousand lawyers worked in law firms that employed fifty or
more lawyers in 1960.196 By the year 2000, more than 120,000 lawyers
worked in firms of that size.' 9 7
Notably, during the modern era, the rate of growth of lawyer income has not always been higher than the rate of growth of worker
income more generally. In the twenty-two year period between 1929
and 1951, the average net income of non-salaried lawyers increased
58%, and the mean net income of persons employed in the legal services industry rose 77%.191 By comparison, the earnings of full-time

employed persons in all industries rose 131%, and the incomes of nonsalaried dentists and non-salaried physicians rose 83% and 157% respectively.199 In the twenty-year period 1959 to 1979, real median
lawyer income first increased and then shrank, ultimately dropping

at E-9 (reporting a median of 1,850 billable hours per year for practitioners); The 2000

Desktop Reference on the Economics of Law Practicein Michigan, supra note 65, at
1562 (reporting a median of thirty-five billable hours per week for practitioners);
ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 73, at 32 (showing Colorado lawyers report a total of forty hours per week of "compensable legal work"); 2005 MISSOURI
BAR ECONOMIC SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 66, at 36 (showing a median of 1,751 to
2,000 hours per year for practitioners); 2005 HOURLY RATE REPORT, supra note 72, at

COLo. 2000

34 (showing a median of thirty-five hours per week for full-time private practitioners).
194. Marc Galanter, "Old and in the Way": The Coming DemographicTransformation of the Legal Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services,
1999 Wis. L. REV. 1081, 1090 (1999).
195. THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000,
supra note 143, at 29.

196. Galanter, supra note 194, at 1090.
197. THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000,
supra note 143, at 9.
198. MILTON Z. KAFOGLIs, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
OHIO 6-7 (1955) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS: NATIONAL INCOME 200-01 (1954); OFFICE OF Bus. ECON.,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 7 (1952)).
199. Id.
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about 2% across the entire period. 20 In contrast, the real median income of people fifteen years old and older rose 19%.201 Incomes in
varied industrial sectors change at different rates in different eras. A
proper explanation of income inequality might even require a thorough explanation of the forces that have shaped twentieth and twentyfirst century economic history, and an examination of those forces lies
outside the intended scope of this Article.2 0 2
In any case, both logic and the evidence suggest that the growing
income disparity being discussed here has not been caused by rampant
overcharging on individuals' legal bills or by runaway increases in the
size of the standard hourly fee-two manifestations of supposed lawyer greed about which Americans seem to worry unnecessarily.
XI. SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE AVERAGE INCOME
OF PARALEGALS

While Americans do not appear to be interested in the size of
paralegals' incomes, Americans should be interested. Paralegals are
legal service providers, and their incomes have to be paid from the
fees charged by lawyers on clients' legal bills. As mentioned above,
the paralegal population in the United States today is about one-quarter the size of the population of active lawyers; the paralegal population is more than one-half the size of the private practitioner
population. Paralegals are a very large group of service providers.
National Association of Legal Assistants ("NALA") figures are available concerning average incomes of paralegals in the United States;
the organization has surveyed members about their total compensation (salary and bonuses) since at least 1988. Table 15 below contains
NALA survey results and compares those results to Census Bureau
data concerning the incomes of United States workers fifteen years
and older between the years 1988 and 2008.

200. Sander & Williams, supra note 30, at 448 (showing that real average lawyer
income ended the time period only 1% lower than it had been at the beginning of the
period; in other words, it essentially neither declined nor increased).
201. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEASURING 50 YEARS OF EcONOMIC CHANGE C-3
tbl.C-2 (1998), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-203.pdf.
202. In the course of research for this Article, the Author uncovered no evidence
that lawyers routinely accused workers in other industries of greed during either of
the two time periods, 1929-1951 or 1959-1979.
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15:

AVERAGE TOTAL MONEY EARNINGS OF FULL- AND PART-TIME
AMERICAN WORKERS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER AND FULL- AND PARTTIME PARALEGALS, 1988-2008. (REAL DOLLAR AMOUNTS ARE IN
CONSTANT 2007 DOLLARS.)2 0 3

Year

Income Of U.S.
Workers In
Constant
Dollars

Income Of
Paralegals In
Constant
Dollars

Income Of U.S.
Workers In
Real Dollars

Income Of
Paralegals In
Real Dollars

1988
1991
1993
1995
1997
2000
2002
2004
2008

$19,419
21,798
NA
26,099
28,754
33,688
35,557
37,151
38,213

$26,023
28,980
29,894
32,000
36,435
40,474
46,074
46,862
50,953

$34,029
33,176
NA
35,501
37,138
40,555
40,973
40,770
38,178

$45,592
44,108
42,898
43,520
47,074
48,731
53,077
51,408
50,905

Percent
Increase 1988
to 2008

96.8%

95.8%

12.2%

11.7%

During the years for which data are available, the overall rate of
increase of paralegals' income has matched almost exactly the rate of
increase of all American workers' income. The income of both sets of
workers rose about 12%.
XII. CONCLUSION
In a capitalist economy, the market is the predominant force setting
the price of goods and services.
During the second half of the twentieth century, American courts
eliminated a number of impediments to the free functioning of the
market for legal services. In 1975, the United States Supreme Court
issued a ruling in the case Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar that ended
the practice by bar associations of promulgating and enforcing legal
services fee schedules. 2 0 In 1977, with the issuance of the majority
203. 1995

NATIONAL UTILIZATION AND COMPENSATION SURVEY REPORT, supra
NATIONAL UTILIZATION AND COMPENSATION SURVEY REPORT, supra

note 105; 2008

note 105; see also Population-Consumer Income Reports (P60), supra note 175;
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, MARCH 1995, supra note 176; Current Population
Survey (CPS), supra note 177.

204. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785-86 (1975) (stating that "there may
be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce" and implying that fee
schedules concerning such services might be legal). It is commonly believed that the
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opinion in Bates v. State Bar Association,20 5 the Supreme Court nullified jurisdictional bans on lawyer advertising. In 1985, the Court invalidated as a practical matter lawyer residency requirements in force
in the majority of states. By mid-twentieth-century, the majority of
states had promulgated rules requiring lawyers to reside in-state, often
for lengthy periods, in order to qualify for licensing. 20 6 The Court's
ruling in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper ended the en-

forcement and promulgation of these rules.2 07
Law schools greatly increased in number and in total enrollment
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In the 1963-1964
academic year, roughly 50,000 Juris Doctor candidates attended 136
ABA-approved American law schools.2 08 In 2009-2010, about
155,000 students attended 200 approved schools.2 0' Although it is
often thought that state bar administrators tightened admissions standards and increased the difficulty of bar examinations during the late
twentieth century, average annual pass rates on the nation's bar examinations have actually climbed substantially since the 1950s. This may
be because of improvements in legal education or better test preparation by applicants, or both. In any case, today's law school graduates
pass the examinations more easily than did law graduates fifty years
ago. Only about 50% of all applicants for admission passed their jurisdictions' bar examinations between the years 1930 and 1950.210
About two-thirds of all takers of the February and July bar examinations pass the examinations annually today.21 Approximately threequarters of first time takers pass each year.2 12 Because total law
school enrollment has increased and because bar passage rates have
risen, the ranks of lawyers have swelled. In 1950, about 222,000 lawGoldfarb decision held that all fee schedules sponsored by the organized bar are illegal, nonetheless. See, e.g., Thomas Morgan, Economic Realities Facing 21st Century
Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REv. 625, 625 n.4 (1994).
205. Bates v. State Bar Ass'n, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
206. ABEL, supra note 191, at 117. After World War II, states imposed residency
requirements on lawyers. Id. Thirty-nine states required lawyers to establish residency through an extended period of stay by the year 1959. Id.
207. Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985).
208. AM. BAR Ass'N, ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED 1963-2011 ACADEMIC YEARS (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal
administrative/legal educationand-admissions to the-bar/statistics/enrollmentdegrees-awarded.authcheckdam.pdf.
209. Id. at 1.
210. Herbert E. Clark, Bar Examinations: Should They Be Nationally Administered?, 36 A.B.A. J. 986, 987 (1950).
211. Ten-Year Summary of Bar Passage Rates, 79 B. EXAMINER 22, 25 (2010). The
pass rate of all bar examination takers in all United States jurisdictions in the year
2009 was 68%. Id. The pass rates of all takers in 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005 respectively were 71%, 67%, 67%, and 64%. Id.
212. Id. The pass rate of all first-time bar examination takers in all U.S. jurisdictions in the year 2009 was 79%. Id. The pass rates of all first-time takers in 2008,
2007, 2006 and 2005 respectively were 82%, 79%, 78%, and 76%. Id.
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yers practiced in the United States.2 13 Today, more than five times as
many practice-1.2 million.2 14 Between the early 1970s and 2006, lawyers hired an increasing number of paralegals as has been mentioned.
Their population increased about eleven and one-half times.2 1 5
There are many more legal service providers today (lawyers and
paralegals) than decades ago who compete more effectively and aggressively for business. Market forces have generated an increased
supply of service providers. Suits brought by consumers and lawyers
have loosened constraints on competition, and such suits by themselves constitute market forces. The market has thus responded to the
increased demand for services.
The evidence that is available indicates that the increase in demand
for services by individuals since the early 1970s has not caused the
exploitation of the public; it has not caused rampant increases in the
size of real lawyer or paralegal hourly fees, nor drastic increases in the
incomes of average paraprofessionals or average private practitioners.
Private practitioners generally have been careful to control hourly
fees. The average practitioner's income has risen more quickly than
that of the average American worker, but this may be due to large
scale economic forces restraining the growth of the average worker's
income and certain law office business practices other than fee hikes.
It does not appear to be due to overbilling. Additionally, the increase
in demand for services has not caused an explosion in profession-wide
manifestations of greed. Today, as a group, practitioners provide
many free services including pro bono services to low-income clients;
they tend to avoid overbearing collection practices and often write off
overdue fees; and they do a significant and impressive amount of community service work. Altruism is certainly not the only reason that
the typical practitioner treats his or her clients and community decently. Lawyers are responding to many external pressures in addition to internal ones like self-interest and conscience. The external
pressures include increased competition, which has resulted from the
swelling in the size of the lawyer population,2 16 the demise of minimum fee schedules, the modern2 1 7 advent of lawyer advertising, and
increased movement of lawyers across jurisdictional borders. The ex213.

AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,

LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 15 (1992).
214. LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE, supra note 104.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
216. Americans sometimes complain that there are too many lawyers, and the average American believes that the country would be better off with fewer lawyers. In
fact, 51% of Americans agree that "[w]e would be better off with fewer lawyers." See
SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 7. This is ironic. Americans should welcome increases in
the size of the population of legal service providers as a means of controlling fees.
217. ABEL, supra note 191, at 118-19. Prior to 1908 and the adoption of the Cannons of Professional Ethics, lawyer advertising was common and generally tolerated
by the public and profession. Id. at 119.
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ternal pressures also include the controls placed on lawyer behavior
by bar authorities, law firms, and malpractice insurance companies.
The term "greedy" is not a fitting adjective to use to describe the typical practitioner. Empirical evidence suggests that the typical practitioner is a prudent businessperson, often willing for both pragmatic
and altruistic reasons to contribute time and money to community
causes and organizations as well as to provide good service to clients.
As such, the "average" or representative lawyer is no different than
the typical businessperson who works in virtually any other American
industry.
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